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THE GAPS BETWEEN THE FINGERS OF THE
INVISIBLE HAND
Bailey Kuklin*
INTRODUCTION
A revolution in legal reasoning began in 1960. With the pub-
lication of Coase's famous article, The Problem of Social Cost,'
the powerful tool of microeconomic analysis grounded on Adam
Smith's invisible hand,2 began to permeate the academic litera-
ture. From journals to classrooms, and eventually to case opin-
ions, the enlightening beam of economics has revealed previously
unperceived connections in the law's seamless web. Especially
for those willing to ascribe normative force to the economists'
analytic construct,3 economics has provided a guiding beacon
* Professor, Brooklyn Law School; J.D., 1966, University of Michigan.
I thank John Cirace, Professor of Economics at Lehman College, for his useful com-
ments on a draft of this Article. Once again, Brooklyn Law School generously supported
this project with a summer research stipend.
1 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960). For the
Pigouvian economic setting of the Coase theorem, see Barbara White, Coase and the
Courts: Economics for the Common Man, 72 IowA L. Rsv. 577, 580-86 (1937), and for
various interpretations of the Coase theorem derivable from his article, see Jules L. Cole-
man, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Ap-
proach to Law, 68 CAL. L Rv. 221, 223-26 (1980); Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14-20 (1982); Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against
"Coaseanism," 99 YALE LJ. 611, 612-13 (1989); Pierre Schlag, An Appreciative Com-
ment on Coase's The Problem of Social Cost: A View from the Left, 1986 Ws. " Rsv.
919, 927-28.
2 See generally ADAi Sr=H, AN QUIY INT n E NATURE AND CAUSES OF E
WEALTH OF NATIONS (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937). For the contention that the economic
analysis of law, Richard Posner's version particularly, substantially diverges from
Smith's vision of the free market and individual liberty, see Robin Paul Malloy, Invisible
Hand or Sleight of Hand? Adam Smith, Richard Posner and the Philosophy of Law and
Economics, 36 KAN. L Rxv. 209 (1988). For expository purposes, I will nevertheless refer
to the economic analysis of law as an invisible hand theory.
3 Coleman classifies three activities within the realm of law and economics, two be-
ing conceptual and one normative. "Analytic law and economics may be either deacrip-
tive or positive. Descriptive law and economics is concerned with the principle of eco-
nomic efficiency as an explanatory tool by which existing legal rules and decisions may
be rationalized or comprehended." Coleman, supra note 1, at 221. "Positive law and eco-
nomics is concerned less with the actual explanatory power of economic efficiency than it
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down the path for the law to travel." While I count myself
among those who celebrate this revolution, one must acknowl-
edge that behind the illuminated legal doctrines, there is cast a
long shadow. Important, sometimes crucial, problems are dimly
perceptible, if at all, in the penumbral grays of microeconomic
analysis. The foundations and dimensions of some doctrines are
consequently often misappreciated, the highlighted parts beguil-
is with the capacity of market models to provide a conceptual apparatus within which
traditional legal problems may be conceived." Id. at 222. "Normative law and economics
is the home of reformers. Existing legal rules are evaluated and new ones fashioned in
terms of their economic efficiency." Id.
Coleman's labeled distinction between the two analytic activities is often overlooked.
See infra note 4.
4 Sen decries the evolution of modem economics towards greater neglect of moral
issues. "The methodology of so-called 'positive economics' has not only shunned norma-
tive analysis in economics, it has also had the effect of ignoring a variety of complex
ethical considerations which affect actual human behavior.. . ." AMARTYA SEN, ON ETIE-
ics AND ECONOMICS 7 (1987). This trend runs contrary to the roots of economics "largely
as an offshoot of ethics", id. at 2 (e.g., Adam Smith was Professor of Moral Philosophy),
and isolates the explicitly moral branch called welfare economics, see id. ch. 2, which in
modem theory has a "precarious" position, because, "as the suspicion of the use of ethics
in economics has grown, welfare economics has appeared to be increasingly dubious." Id.
at 29.
Most economists, including the law and economics school, draw conclusions based
on allegedly value-neutral assumptions. See, e.g., Bernard Saffran, Markets and Justice:
An Economist's Perspective, in MARKETS AND JUSTICE 303, 304-05 (John W. Chapman &
J. Roland Pennock eds., 1989) ("Even though the interest of economists in discussions of
justice is growing... most economists do not want to get involved in this matter because
they are uncomfortable with having uniquely to define justice, are afraid of imposing
their own values, and have had difficulty finding an appropriate analytical mechanism.");
White, supra note 1, at 579 ("Coase implicitly claims that his approach does not contain
value choices . . . ."). Posner, to the contrary, ascribes a normative function to law and
economics, i.e., a society ought to strive for efficiency. See, e.g., RICHARD A. PosNE, TUE
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 48-115 (1981). Whether economics in principle can be purely ana-
lytic, without resort to normative considerations, has been challenged. See infra note
124. Whether analytic economists in fact stay in the non-normative domain has also been
questioned. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Harrison, Trends and Traces: A Preliminary Evaluation
of Economic Analysis in Contract Law, 1988 ANN. SURe. AM. L. 73, 77 ("Those who
dream up efficient rules but stop short of insisting on their adoption argue by implica-
tion that the proposals deserve consideration."); White, supra note 1, at 579 ("[A]n anal-
ysis of [Coase's] methodology indicates that his theory does indeed mask [a value
choice]."). Whether such economists actually even pretend to remain purely analytic has
also been critiqued. See Thomas Russell & Richard Thaler, The Relevance of Quasi Ra-
tionality in Competitive Markets, 75 An. EcoN. REv. 1071, 1081 (1985) ("The usual ap-
proach in economics is to solve for the optimal solution to a problem, and then to as-
sume the agents in the model chose accordingly. Thus the model is supposed to be
simultaneously normative and descriptive."). That economists typically do not face up to
the normative features of their discipline may be "theoretical escapism." See GUNNAR
MYRDAL, OBJECTImV IN SocIA RESEARCH ch. XXII (1969).
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ing one into forgetting that there is more than meets the eye and
that the indistinct margins are often where the controversies lie.
In this Article I attend to some of the shortcomings in law and
economics, particularly ones pertaining to the bedrock assump-
tion of the ability of an economic actor to make a rational, self-
interested choice.
Law and economics has undergone critical evaluation almost
from the beginning.5 This Article pulls together some criticisms
and develops others to demonstrate that the gaps between the
fingers of the invisible hand may be used, abused or ignored to
facilitate legal conclusions stronger than are warranted." The
topics addressed are: the rationalization of irrationality, particu-
larly, discount schedules, risk attitudes, psychic income, tastes,
and transaction costs; indeterminacies, specifically, utility func-
tions, externalities, what-is-a-cost-of-what, moralisms, and
shadow markets; and efficiency, including considerations of the
unrealistic assumptions of the market model, superrationality,
cardinal versus ordinal valuation, and the theory of second best.
In Adam Smith's world of the invisible hand, individuals
transact to increase their own utilities. With each person's
wealth as a given, and against a background of specified legal
entitlements, individuals can choose to enter transactions per-
ceived as best for themselves. Government intervention is eco-
nomically unnecessary.7 Beyond being superfluous, owing to the
5 The literature is extensive. For criticism of the Coase theorem in particular, see,
e.g., JEFFRm MURPHY & Ju.Es CoLmm, Tim PHmOsoPHy o LAw 258-62 (1984); Viroug
A. Aivazian & Jeffrey L. Callen, The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core, 24 JL &
EcoN. 175 (1981); Cooter, supra note 1; Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production
Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CA. L. Rzv. 669 (1979); Donald H.
Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & EON. 427 (1972); Schlag, supra
note 1; White, supra note 1. The landmark status of the Coase theorem is emphasized,
perhaps overemphasized, in Donald H. Gjerdingen, The Politics of the Coase Theorem
and Its Relationship to Modern Legal Thought, 35 BuFr. L Rsv. 871 (1986).
6 In general "[t]here are four major targets of criticism of the market: efficiency,
distributive justice, personality, and quality of life. Market influences on any one of them
also influence the other three ... ." Robert E. Lane, Market Choice and Human Choice,
in MARKETS AN JUSTIcE, supra note 4, at 226.
7 The Coase analysis, however, implies that intervention is sometimes vwranted.
See Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & EcON. 141, 160-61 (1979).
Under the invisible hand, moral suasion is also less necessary. "To the extent that
men are allowed freely to trade, conceived in the broadest possible sense of this term,
there is little need for the preacher or the administrative authority." Jame3 A.
Buchanan, Good Economics-Bad Law, 60 VA. L. Ray. 483, 486 (1974). Furthermore,
restrictions "invite evasion, and... serve to penalize the law-abiding... ." Id. at 487.
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foibles of officials, intervention may lead to inefficiency,8 inva-.
sion of private liberty and rights," and undermining of democ-
racy through overreaching. 10 The slippery slope of intervention
threatens."
The construction of the world of the invisible hand assumes
certain conditions. Though these have been specified in various
ways, a representative list is:
8 See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Choice of the Institutional Framework: A Com-
ment, in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 77, 78 (Anthony T. Kronman & Richard A.
Posner eds., 1979); Allan Gibbard, Social Choice Theory and the Imperfectability of a
Legal Order, 10 HOFSTRA L. Rxv. 401, 402-03 (1982); Roberta Romano, A Comment on
Information Overload, Cognitive Illusions, and Their Implications for Public Policy, 59
S. CAL. L. REv. 313, 320 (1986) (cartelization or rent-seeking theory of the political pro-
cess and the capture theory of regulation); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (Spring 1971) (capture theory of regulation).
9 See, e.g., JOHN E.ED. ACTON, ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND POWER 364 (Gertrude Him-
melfarb ed., 1948). Malloy identifies Adam Smith, Friedrich A. Hayek, and Milton Fried-
man as among the "classical liberals ... who share a common belief that the free market
approach to law and social policy best ensures the greatest possible sphere of personal
liberty for the individual." Robin Paul Malloy, Equating Human Rights and Property
Rights-The Need for Moral Judgment in an Economic Analysis of Law and Social
Policy, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 163, 164 (1986). But these classical liberals are not against all
government intervention. See, e.g., Malloy, supra note 2, at 217 (Smith condoned appro-
priate government restraints of natural liberty and favored aid to the poor). Posner him-
self is not entirely against redistribution. See Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization
Revisited, 2 J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 85, 95 (1985) (favoring "lightly regulated capital-
ism," including "some redistribution through the tax and government expenditure sys-
tem," to maximize society's wealth).
10 See, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 183-84 (1957);
JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATuRAL RIGHTS 221-23 (1980); 1 FREDERICH A. HAYEK,
LAW, LEGISLATION AND LmERTY 55 (1973). Schauer discusses "the argument from added
authority, that warns against allowing the decisionmaker to enter a given decisional
sphere." Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARv. L. REv. 361, 367 (1985). The
"Hobbes Theorem," the "polar opposite" of the Coase theorem, pessimistically asserts
that a coercive government (i.e., the prince or leviathan) is unavoidably necessary to
avoid peoples' threats against one another. See Cooter, supra note 1, at 18-20. For an
examination and criticism of the market paradigm, seemingly at the foundation of law
and economics theory, under which law, politics and morality are justified only as a coop-
erative solution to market failure, see Jules Coleman, Competition and Cooperation, 98
ETHICS 76 (1987).
" See, e.g., 2 FREDERicH A. HAYEK. LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 84-85 (1976);
JOHN KLINIG, PATERNALISM 190-91 (1984) ("Given the large resources of government and
the aggrandizing tendencies of bureaucrats, excessive involvement in the marketplace is
all too likely."). The proper response to the slippery slope argument is the old saw about
the baby and the bath water. See, e.g., id. at 191. A notch in the slope must be found or
made. See Schauer, supra note 10, at 378-81 ("Where do you draw the line?"); see also
Bailey Kuklin, Self-Paternalism in the Marketplace, 60 U. CIN. L. Rav. 649, 711-12
(1992) (discussing the Scylla and Charybdis of intervention and nonintervention).
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1. Full information is available about the performance and qual-
ity of goods and services and the costs of all alternative ways of pro-
ducing them, and the cost of this information is zero.
2. Costs of enforcing contracts and property rights are zero, and
property rights, including rights to the means of production, are es-
tablished and stable.
3. Individuals are rational in this sense: their preferences are or-
ganized in a transitive ordering (such that if an individual prefers A to
B and B to C, he also prefers A to C) and they are capable of selecting
appropriate means toward their ends.
4.(a) Transaction costs are zero (transaction costs include costs of
bringing goods and services together for exchange, and costs of reach-
ing agreements for exchange.. .. ) or (b) there is perfect competition
(that is, no buyer or seller can influence prices by his own indepen-
dent actions and there is complete freedom to enter and exit the mar-
ket) and no externalities are present. (An externality is a "neighbor-
hood" or "third-party" effect of a market exchange: an effect on
someone's well-being which is not taken into account in the market
exchange.)
5. Products offered in the market are undifferentiated-buyers
cannot distinguish between the products offered by various sellers and
vice versa."'
These simplifying assumptions are the source of many of the
shortcomings faced here. In discussing them I will sometimes il-
lustrate the points by relying on a hypothetical sale of an infre-
quently purchased consumer good, say, a television set, in which
the consumer has no special knowledge of the product or its pro-
ducers, merchants and repairers. The occasional nature of this
type of purchase highlights the information and other
difficulties.13
12 ALLEN K BucHANn, ETmcs, EFFiciENcY, AND THE MAmxET 14-15 (1985). For other
versions, see, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Market Contractarianism and the Unanimity Rule,
Soc. PHi. & POL'Y, Spring 1985, at 69, 70; Daniel M. Hausman, Are Markets Morally
Free Zones?, 18 Pwi. & Pus. AFF. 317, 318 (Fall 1989) (conditions of perfectly competi-
tive market); Malloy, supra note 2, at 243-44 (outlining and describing assumptions and
underlying values of the neoclassical economic model); cf. Richard A. Posner, The Law
and Economics Movement, 77 A. EcoN. Rxv. 1, 5 (1987) (PAPEis & PRoc.) (premises of
the economic analysis of "nonmarket" law).
13 From an information standpoint, three types of qualities about goods may be
identified: search, experience, and credence. See Bailey Kutlin, The Asymmetrical Con-
ditions of Legal Responsibility in the Marketplace, 44 U. MLu L. RV. 893, 938-40
(1990). Search qualities are apparent from inspection alone, such as the aesthetics of a
television sets picture (under the conditions of the showroom). Experience qualitie3 are
revealed by use after purchase, such as the durability of the set. Credence qualities re-
quire expertise after the fact. such as whether all the parts replaced by the television
repairer were actually needed. The reason for reliance on the hypothetical television
1992]
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I. THE RATIONALIZATION OF IRRATIONALITY
In deciding what is best for herself, a person is not "a light-
ning calculator of pleasures and pains."'1 4 Nor is a person even a
molasses calculator, if by "calculator" one means a mathemati-
cally certain reckoner. Given all the time she needs, an individ-
ual does not consciously calculate the value of reasonably antici-
pated costs and benefits in a manner expected of a statistical
sophisticate under suitable conditions."5 Instead, the appraisal
purchase can now be clarified. Unlike for commonly purchased goods, say, a bar of soap,
television purchases are: first, not based on personal experience with current models;
second, relatively pricey but not so expensive as to justify running up substantial infor-
mation (transaction) costs; third, about goods that reveal few of their important qualities
by showroom inspection alone; and fourth, as in repairs, have important prospective
credence qualities.
1, FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DEm1IzaNcE. THE LEGAL THREAT IN
CRIME CONTROL 76 (1973) (quoting Thorsten Veblen, also citing A.J. Ayer and H.L.A.
Hart); see also Gary S. Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, in THE ECO-
NOMIc APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 153, 153 (1976) ("lightning-fast calculation" an
earlier economic meaning of "rational"); Victor P. Goldberg, Aversion to Risk Aversion
in the New Institutional Economics, 146 JrrE 216, 217 (1990) ("I am bewildered by
economists who make the 'people really are risk averse' argument and at the same time
make wildly unrealistic assumptions about the ability of individuals to make complex
calculations and engage in long chains of sophisticated reasoning ... ." Some of these
"sophisticated mental feats" are "routinely assigned to them by economic theorists.");
Oskar Morgenstern, Thirteen Critical Points in Contemporary Economic Theory: An
Interpretation, 10 J. EcoN. Lrr. 1163, 1175 (1972) (Under fixed conditions, "[o]ptimal
allocation is a conceptually simple matter for the consumer .... [But] [t]his may be
computationally of phenomenal difficulty.. . ."). For the importance to economics of
"computational efficiency," and the actual shortcomings, see 2 Herbert A. Simon, From
Substantive to Procedural Rationality, in MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY 424 (1982).
1 Consequently, she may not be rational. "[E]conomic theory has been erected
upon the supposition that conscious rationality prevails. . . ." DOWNS, supra note 10, at
4. In economic theory, "now everyone more or less agrees that rational behavior simply
implies consistent maximization of a well-ordered function, such as a utility or profit
function." Becker, supra note 14, at 153. For elaboration, see, e.g., DowNs, supra note 10,
at 4-6; SEN, supra note 4, at 12-22 (criticizing the two meanings of economic rationality:
internal consistency of choice and maximization of self-interest); Kenneth J. Arrow, Pub-
lic and Private Values, in HUMAN VALUES AnD ECONOMIC POLICY 3, 4-6 (Sidney Hook ed.,
1967) (economic rationality as "consistent ordering"). For comparison to the broader
meaning of rationality in other social sciences, see, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE
SIRENS 137-41 (rev. ed. 1984); 2 Herbert A. Simon, Rationality, in MODELS OF BOUNDED
RATIONALITY, supra note 14, at 405; 2 Herbert A. Simon, Rationality as Process and as
Product of Thought, in MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY, supra note 14, at 444. For the
relationship of rationality, including economic rationality, to responsibility, see Kuklin,
supra note 13. One psychologist claims that, given the economists' "particular definition
of rational behavior, and despite appearances to the contrary, all behavior, free to vary,
can be considered rational." Howard Rachlin, Economics and Behavioral Psychology, in
LIMrrs TO ACTION. THE ALLOCATION OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 205, 206 (John Staddon ed.,
[Vol. 58: 835
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tends to be too conservative or too liberal.
Social scientists who study choice under risk and uncer-
tainty offer many explanations for the flaws in one's reasoning.10
The following are only a few among the great hodgepodge of
causes.17 For one, the setting in which information is imparted
may give rise to framing distortions that affect the perception of
facts and the formation of preferences. Fancy showrooms, adver-
tisements by attractive spokespersons, selective presentation of
data, or even use of vague, complicated, or buried contract terms
slant the perception of a product's true qualities and desirabil-
ity. Heuristics are rules of thumb for making appraisals. These
are biased by such factors as the person's predispositions and
desireg (e.g., wishful thinking or cognitive dissonance), as well as
the salience, vividness, or availability of relevant data (e.g., a re-
cent airplane crash causes many cancellations). Though econo-
mists are primarily concerned with fully rational actors, 8 they
1980) (emphasis omitted); see also MAIrM HoLLIs & EDWAnn J. NELL, Rmox. Eco-
NOMC MAN 56 (1975) ("So in whatever way [economic] rationality is introduced, the
statement of it is either vacuous or untestable."). The economists' label "rational" for its
particular notion has also been criticized for being loaded. See Richard B. Brandt, Per-
sonal Values and the Justification of Institutions, in HUMAN VALus AND EcoS0i mc
PoLcY, supra, at 22, 30-31 (The economist "is using a familiar word with complex as-
sociations, and therefore in calling an action rational he tends to suggest or imply that
the behavior in question is to be recommended, that it is desirable . )..."); Paul Kurtz,
Policy Decisions and Value in Metaeconomics, in Hum.m VALuEs AND EcoNonuc Poucy,
supra, at 150, 153 (" 'Rationality,' however, is notoriously value-charged; and one has to
be careful that it is not merely a persuasive term."). On the other hand, Barry, referring
to economic theory, urges that principled moral choices of ends or objects of desire are
rational when they "show a consistent pattern of preference." BIAN BARRY, PoLmC.
ARGumENT 4 (1965).
"6 Under the conventional distinction, a decision under risk occurs when "each ac-
tion leads to one of a set of possible specific outcomes, each outcome occurring with a
known probability," while one under uncertainty occurs when a contemplated alternative
"has as its consequence a set of possible specific outcomes, but where the probabilities of
these outcomes are completely unknown or are not even meaningful." R. DuwcAN LucE &
HowARD RAIFFA. GAms AN DECISIONS 13 (1957).
1 The types of distortions are extensively surveyed in Kutlin, supra note 13, at
971-79.
IS Under the economic paradigm, "markets are assumed to reflect actions taken by
experienced decision makers seeking to maximize their own gains and, simultaneously,
keeping the market efficient by exploiting the errors of others." Robin M. Hogarth &
Melvin W. Reder, Introduction: Perspectives from Economics and Psychology, in RA-
TIONAL CHOICE 1, 6 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1987). Irrational actors
are of little interest to economists "since they believe these agents will not survive in the
market." Id. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 14, at 167 (in conclusion, "irrational units
would often be 'forced' by a change in opportunities to respond rationally"). Hence, in
1992]
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do not, or need not, deny that errors in calculation occur, at
least when they are random in. nature.19 But even when random
across a broad population, and hence allocatively irrelevant, dis-
tributive questions may arise since some individuals or classes
may systematically get the short end of the stick. Yet the reach
and significance of the biasing effects on rational choice are eas-
ily forgotten when certain economic "wild cards" appear on the
table, thereby plausibly explaining the variance in individual
choices, including ones downright peculiar, in terms other than
irrationality. The diversity may be attributed instead to such in-
terrelating notions as discount schedules, risk attitudes, psychic
income, tastes, and transaction costs.20
light of its assumptions and resistance to demanded verification of them, "neoclassical
economics becomes, as has been observed more than once, essentially tautological and
irrefutable." Herbert A. Simon, Rationality in Psychology and Economics, in RATIONAL
CHOICE, supra, at 25, 38; see also Rachlin, supra note 15, at 205 ("To the extent that
behavior fails to conform to predictions of economic theory, it is labeled irrational. Much
human . . . behavior would seem to fall into this category."); Howard Rachlin et al.,
Substitutability in Time Allocation, 87 PSYCHOL. REv. 355, 359 n.1 (1980) ("Economics
is often said to be a science of rational behavior, but 'rationality' means no more to
economists than conformity to economic theory. Economics is properly a science of max-
imization rather than rationality."). The leader among economists in exploring the limits
to rationality is Herbert A. Simon. See, e.g., MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY, supra
note 14. Other economists are starting to pay attention. See, e.g., Russell & Thaler,
supra note 4.
19 While economists recognize that actors make decisions based on errors and incon-
sistencies, "the fallibilities of economic agents are assumed to be of a random rather than
a systematic nature. That is, since agents who make systematic errors would be exploited
by other agents and eventually forced to withdraw from the market, they would no
longer be the subject of economic enquiry." Hogarth & Reder, supra note 18, at 6. The
question remains, however, when the economic agent is, say, a consumer, how can she
withdraw from the market?
20 When faced with the psychological experiments evidencing people's poor ability
to make rational choices under conditions of risk and uncertainty, "economists are forced
into 'rationalizing,' discrediting, or arguing the irrelevance of the empirical findings."
Hogarth & Reder, supra note 18, at 5 (footnote omitted). As one Nobel Prize winning
economist puts it, neoclassical economists "are prepared to make whatever auxiliary em-
pirical assumptions are necessary in order to preserve the utility-maximization postulate,
even when the empirical assumptions are unverified." Herbert A. Simon, Rationality in
Psychology and Economics, in RATIONAL CHOICE, supra note 18, at 25, 38. "Hence neo-
classical theory, as usually applied, is an exceedingly weak theory, as shown by the diffi-
culty of finding sets of facts, actual or hypothetical, that cannot be rationalized and
made consistent with it." Id. at 39. For a summary and critique of the economists' com-
mon "formidable set of defenses in the form of bolstering assumptions that restrict the
significance of any observed violation of the model [of assumed rationality]," see Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, in RA-
TIONAL CHOICE, supra note 18, at 67, 89-91. Similarly, another Nobel Prize winning econ-
omist, "disentangle[s] some of the senses in which the hypothesis of rationality is used in
[Vol. 58: 835
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A. Discount Schedules
If one could opt for a nickel immediately or a dime in an
hour, and there is no pressing need for cash, it seems prudent to
choose the dime.2 1 The five cents invested at the going rate
would fall far short of ten cents at the end of an hour. Sensible
motivations for the immediate gratification from opting for the
nickel are not easy to imagine, especially if such factors as un-
certainty over whether the dime will be forthcoming are elimi-
nated. A common intuition is that one rationally should be in-
different to when one obtains a particular satisfaction-it's the
same satisfaction whenever it occurs.22 But as is commonly ex-
perienced, people have a wide range of preferences pertaining to
whether they are to realize goods sooner or later.23 If an adult
chooses the immediate nickel over the briefly delayed dime,
should she be declared incompetent, or at least, somewhat irra-
tional? No, according to economic analysis; the choice only
manifests her discount schedule.24 She has a high discount rate.
Indeed, there is truth to this. Yet what most would consider a
childish preference for instant gratification can be fully buried
economic theory," and argues that when the ideal "conditions cease to hold, the rational-
ity assumptions become strained and possibly even self-contradictory." Kenneth J. Ar-
row, Rationality of Self and Others in an Economic System, in RAroNA. CHoiCE, supra
note 18, at 201.
21 Experiments verify that young children generally opt for immediate gratification.
See, e.g., Rachlin, supra note 15, at 209; see generally George Ainslie, Specious Reward:
A Behavioral Theory of Impulsiveness and Impulse Control, 82 PSYCHOL BULL. 463,
464-70 (1975). This is one of the reasons children are declared incompetent. See Janxss
BFNmAm, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPS OF MoRALs AND LEGMISATnON 161 (J. Burns &
LL.A. Hart eds., 1970) (1st ed. Oxford 1789).
2 See, e.g., EIssrxR, supra note 15, at 66-71; ROBm E. GOODIN. PoLmCAL THORY
AND PUBLIC POLICY 162-63 (1982); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY oF JusTcC 295 (1971); HNaY
SMwicK, THE MEroDS OF ETmcs 124 n.1 (7th ed. 1907).
2See, e.g., SHLomo hrrAL. I , Ds, MARSm, AD MoNEY 53-59 (1952); AnmuR M
OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY 80-81 (1975); TiBOR SCITOVSKY, THE JoiiEss EcoNomy
72-75 (1976); George Ainslie, Beyond Microeconomics: Conflict Among Interests in a
Multiple Self as a Determinant of Value, in THE MULTIPLE Sup 133, 138-39 (Jon ElAster
ed., 1986). Relatedly, Zimring and Hawkins discuss whether one is future-oriented or
present-oriented, optimistic or pessimistic. See ZILmoG & HAWINs, supra note 14, at
98-104.
2 There may be quite plausible reasons for choosing the immediate payoff. Maital
lists several reasons for taking $50 today rather than $100 in five years: a high expected
inflation rate; the prospective death of the payee; the unreliability of the payor, a press-
ing need on the payee; and, advantageous interim investment opportunities. See MArrAL,
supra note 23, at 57-58. At some point society blows the whistle and declares the dis-
count out-of-bounds. The boundaries, however, are exceedingly wide.
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within the notion of a discount schedule. Under this reasoning,
when all else is equal, that the consumer buys a particular tele-
vision set with exorbitant future service requirements, rather
than buying the slightly more expensive set with substantially
lower service needs, says nothing about the rationality of the
choice. It merely indicates that the consumer has a high dis-
count rate.
B. Risk Attitudes
An individual's risk attitude reflects her taste for, or enjoy-
ment of, risk.2 5 One may be a risk preferrer, a risk avoider, or
risk neutral.2 I The attitude may vary with the circumstances.2 1
It can explain behavior otherwise inexplicable. If, for example, a
person jumps without a parachute from a high-flying airplane
into the ocean because the great danger is exhilarating, an econ-
omist might say she is a risk preferrer. Others are likely to say
she is nuts.28 As the jumps descend to lower planes, cliffs, tow-
" See, e.g., ZIMRING & HAwmiNs, supra note 14, at 104-06; Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, The Psychology of Preferences, SCL AM., Jan. 1982, at 160.
2" Notice that, from an internal point of view, one's attitudes do not make one bet-
ter or worse off, unless one regrets them, since the attitudes "enter among the criteria for
what is worse or better." Jon Elster, Comments on Krouse and McPherson, 97 ETHIcs
146, 153 n.20 (1986).
27 See MARY DOUGLAS, RISK AccEi-rABmrry ACCORDING TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 77-78
(1985); Elizabeth Anderson, Values, Risks, and Market Norms, 17 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 54,
60-63 (1988); Jules L. Coleman, The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical
Review of Richard Posner's The Economics of Justice, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1130
(1982). For analyses of rational risk taking, see JoEL FEINBERO, HARM TO SELF 101.04
(1986); Eric Von Magus, Preference, Rationality, and Risk Taking, 94 ETHIcs 637
(1984). Studies reveal that decisions involving risk are extremely difficult as a practical
matter and are greatly affected by the context. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRIcA 263
(1979). See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
28 Or, in a different context, that she is negligent. "Unreasonable risk-taking--doing
that which a reasonable man would not do-is now the standard measure of negligence."
George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REV. 537, 557 n.74
(1972). One must be careful, however, of the reasonable person standard for risk taking
that imperils only personal harm, for this threatens personal autonomy. See FINBEGO,
supra note 27, at 106-13, 159-62; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with
Private Preferences, 53 U. CHL L. REv. 1129, 1168-69 (1986) ("What appears to be an
irrational evaluation of a danger may in fact be a subjective attraction to risk, a prefer-
ence that should not be interfered with if there is no independent basis for concern.");
Daniel Wilder, Persuasion and Coercion for Health: Ethical Issues in Governnent Ef-
forts to Change Life-Styles, in PATERNALISM 35, 42 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983) (risking
one's health, e.g., overeating, may be rational and voluntary).
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ers, and diving boards, more appraisers will convert their label
from insane thrill-seeking to sensible risk preference. Nearly ev-
eryone will take on a (one meter) diving board even though
there remains some risk of injury. Those who will not are risk
avoiders. How do we decide whether these jumpers fully appre-
ciate the risks they assume? We do not. Instead we throw into
the calculations a wild card: risk attitudes. That explains the be-
havior, in some sense, and evades the knotty question of when
risk attitudes verge into irresponsibility."' But short of wild ex-
tremes, what other choice is there, really, for both risk attitudes
and discount schedules? In a liberal democracy there is and
should be a substantial range of behavior that passes as accept-
able as long as it does not impinge on others. Besides, these be-
havioral constructs allow us to carry on unimpeded with the eco-
nomic modeling of rational choice and keep governmental
interveners more easily on a short leash.30
29 One economist characterizes the wild card feature: "Risk aversion is a conversa-
tion-stopper." Goldberg, supra note 14, at 216. At least as a practical matter it is an
economic conversation-stopper because it typically immunizes from scrutiny the various
forces at play that comprise risk aversion. See id. Regarding risk-taking, "[i]nconsistency
and variability.., should probably be expected." Von Magnus, supra note 27, at 642.
Accurate quantitative information about risk attitudes requires an examination of risk-
taking under conditions favorable to rational behavior, which perhaps is rarely the case.
Owing to the large social element of risk attitudes, another condition is "that there has
been some accumulated and reflective social experience with the kind of risk taking in
question and that the risk taker has had the opportunity to be influenced by it." Id. at
643. "Rational risk/benefit preferences can be understood, with admitted vaguenes.3, as a
kind of socially established equilibrium, a golden mean between perceived excesses of
caution and recklessness." Id. See also DOUGLAS, supra note 27, at 68 (the notion of risk
is culturally determined).
so For example, a difficult issue is when considerations of voluntarines and assump-
tions of risk justify paternalistic intervention. See, eg., FEWBEG, supra note 27, ch. 20;
KLEMG, supra note 11, at 69-70, 75-76.
Another point regarding risk attitudes may be raised. Rizzo criticizes Posner and
Landes for assuming risk neutrality in their modeling of efficiency in tort law. "This
permits them to deal with the simpler notion of expected wealth rather than the more
complex expected utility." Mario J. Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HorsRA L REv.
641, 645 (1980). See infra notes 54-68 and accompanying text (concerning the difficulty
of specifying utility functions). On the other hand, because risk preferrers and avoiders
probably feel the same amount of pain when the risk comes to fruition, Goodin argues
from a public policy standpoint that the differences in tastes should "usually only be a
marginal consideration." GooDiN, supra note 22, at 147. Yet in choosing collective risks,
especially ones involving catastrophic consequences, "[iut seems to be wrong to allow the
majority to impose its risk preferences on the rest, even if those preferences are perfectly
well informed, stable, and so on." Id. at 158. Assuming risk neutrality in economic theory
may have this wrongful tendency. Imputed risk attitudes are often ad hoc. See BAnucH
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C. Psychic Income
Risk attitudes may be further analyzed. One approach to
this and other decisional perplexities is to maintain that an indi-
vidual's choice partially reflects her expected "psychic in-
come. '31 She takes a high risk, for example, because she gets
pleasure from it. To overstate the point, the same general moti-
vation induces murderers facing severe penalties to do the dirty
deed anyway.3 2 Similarly, risk avoiders overinsure because of the
increased sense of security. That explains everything, or con-
versely, in the view of some, nothing at all.as There are, of
course, internal satisfactions and they are important to the good
life. Indeed, the good life may be determined by these satisfac-
tions alone.3 4 But along with the problem of determining
FIsCHHOFF ET AL., ACCEPTABLE RISK 113 (1981). These authors argue on grounds of cau-
tion and Goodin's reason above that "those who make acceptable-risk decisions on be-
half of others have a moral duty to be risk neutral even when the people affected by
their decisions are risk averse or risk prone." Id.
31 "What is often called 'psychic income' concerns utility due to the fact that Smith
feels better about himself by behaving in a certain way, for example, the sense of well-
being that accompanies satisfaction of one's sense of duty, or doing one's fair share."
HOWARD MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM, AND RATIONALITY 59 (1982). For an example
of the use of this wild card, see, e.g., Gary S. Becker, An Economic Analysis of Fertility,
in THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR, supra note 14, at 171, 172-73 (analyz-
ing children as source of psychic income). Cf. SIGMUND FREUD. THE PROBLEM OF ANXIETY
27-28 (1936) (discussing "secondary gains" of neurosis).
s2 By looking at it this way we may execute them without concern for whether they
were truly responsible for the crime.
3 Margolis notices that "some writers seem to have no qualms about invoking
psychic income to explain behavior that seems irrational in terms of the more usual com-
ponents of an economic utility calculus ... whereas others ... treat psychic income as
mere ad hocery that explains nothing at all in terms of rational choice." MARGOLIS, supra
note 31, at 59 (footnote omitted). Under the latter view, psychic income is not meaning-
less in explaining motives, but rather it "does not tell us anything more than we already
know, namely, that there is apparently something which does not fit in a conventional
utility calculus that accounts for the observed behavior." Id. Having no generally under-
stood interpretation or analytical treatment, the notion may be "only a device for paper-
ing over difficulties." Id. Simon refers to the entrepreneur who balances psychic income
against profit losses. "But if we allow 'psychic income,' the criterion of profit maximiza-
tion loses all of its definiteness." 2 Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Decision-Making in
Economics and Behavioral Science, in MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY, supra note 14,
at 287, 296. "'Psychic income'-a wobbling crutch for egoism-explains little of sub-
stance about motivation." Jeffrey Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions:
The Limits of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309, 1319 (1986) (footnote omit-
ted) (referring to psychic income as tautological, "self-sealing," "puncture proof,"
"filler").
For example, Sen criticizes the concept of rationality prevalent in economics be-
cause, among other reasons, "the exclusion of any consideration other than self-interest
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whether an individual actually reaps the psychic income that
makes hers a rational choice is that some internal effects foster
the bad life.35 Additionally, some choices do not advance the
good life as much as others. One should not lump together all
plausible internal effects indifferently under the label "psychic
income" and use this as a means to examine no further behavior
against the actor's better (more rational!) self-interest.30 Even in
seems to impose a wholly arbitrary limitation on the notion of rationality." Amartya K.
Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6
PHIL & PUB. AFF. 317, 342 (1977). He distinguishes sympathy from commitment. Sympa-
thy "corresponds to the case in which the concern for others directly affects one's own
welfare," and thus "is in an important sense egoistic." Id. at 336. Commitment, on the
other hand, relates to the case that "does not make you feel personally worse off, but you
think it is wrong and you are ready to do something to stop it," and thus "which would
be non-egoistic in this sense." Id. "The characteristic of commitment with which I am
most concerned here is the fact that it drives a wedge between personal choice and per-
sonal welfare, and much of traditional economic theory relies on the identity of the two."
Id. at 329. Without this internal, noneconomic effect, the world would be a sorrier place.
If an economist did acknowledge this commitment, it could be thrown into the miscella-
neous category, psychic income, and then used as a wild card to explain behavior other-
wise economically unaccountable. Williams observes that laissez faire economists main-
tain the self-interest model "in the face of the obvious fact that all economic systems
depend on people in society having dispositions that extend beyond self-interest." Ban-
NARD WLniAMs, ETmIcs AND THE Lum1s oF PmILosoPHY 13 (1985); see also Harrison,
supra note 33, at 1311-12 ("Because the narrow self-interest assumption is inherently
ambiguous and frequently inaccurate, we should regard with caution the conclusions that
follow from it."). If everyone actually acted purely out of self-interest, Parfit advances
the practical problem that "the actual outcome will be worse for everyone." Dnnm
PARFIT, PAsNS AND PERSONS 62 (1984). Therefore, along with economics, politics and
morality also are needed. Id. For a powerful economic ratiocination of internal effects,
such as commitment, that goes far to dislodge the wedge between choice and welfare
referred to by Sen, see MARGOLIS, supra note 31. That Sen also pulled at the wedge, see
Sen, supra, at 335-41 (for moral judgments, "rankings of preference rankings").
3' The economic conception of psychic income, like that of tastes, the next topic,
fails to distinguish the morally acceptable from the unacceptable, e.g., malice. See infra
note 44.
"' The overgenerality of economic analysis in dealing with internal effects, i.e., de-
sire, is discussed in Alfred F. MacKay, Human Motivation: The Inadequacy of Econo-
mists' Models, 10 HOFSTRA L. RIv. 441 (1982). He points out that many economists con-
ceive of human motivation as a general mental image of "a set of features,
characteristics, or properties which together constitute the basis of the desire for the
thing." Id. at 441. Yet MacKay suggests that "[d]irect desire focuses directly on a partic-
ular object, without intervening lists of characteristics or features in mind; it is funda-
mental and not derived; it operates without implicit prediction and assessment, without
comparison and evaluation, and without potential substitutability." Id. at 444. While
Sen, the economist, has questioned the standard model of motivation, see Sen, supra
note 34, MacKay leaves "for another occasion" the implications of a proper model of
human motivation. MacKay, supra, at 454.
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a liberal democracy, society must draw the line somewhere.3 7
D. Tastes
The topic of tastes treats generally the variation of prefer-
ences among decisionmakers in similar circumstances.3 8 Under
the theory of revealed preferences, economists take as a given an
individual's tastes 9 and assume she acts rationally, in other
words, best for herself in light of her tastes.40 That two persons,
17 When society takes legal cognizance of mental states, overreaching is threatened.
Especially if other-regarding considerations are placed in the calculus for public choices,
a liberty-limiting principle is needed, such as Mill's "harm principle," to prevent undue
invasions of liberty, for example, invasions of the right of privacy. See, e.g., Arrow, supra
note 15, at 10-12; Amartya K. Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, in PIILOSO-
PHY AND ECONOMIC THEORY 127 (Frank Hahn & Martin Hollis eds., 1979). For the idea of
liberty-limiting principles, see JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 7-14, 26-27 (1984).
3' Baler observes that economists use "preference" in an encompassing technical
sense to mean "the order of priority in which a person chooses from a given set of alter-
natives," thereby including such motivations as religious and moral, whereas in normal
discourse one would distinguish these, e.g., she chooses the moral option even though she
prefers the immoral one. Kurt Baler, Welfare and Preference, in HUMAN VALUES AND
ECONOMIC POLICY, supra note 15, at 120, 131; see also Kurt Baler, Rationality, Value,
and Preference, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y (Spring 1988) at 17, 22-26 [hereinafter Rationality]
(distinguishing meanings of "preference"). This topic closely relates to the topic of util-
ity functions. See supra, at 27.
" The assumption that preferences can be taken as a given has been called "the
Achilles heel of neoclassical economics." Mancur Olson & Christopher K. Clague, Dissent
in Economics: The Convergence of Extremes, in THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO PUBLIC
POLICY 79, 86 (Ryan C. Amacher et al. eds., 1976). A person does not rationally choose
his preferences in a strong sense, "he can only try to structure or restructure his prefer-
ences (and choices) in the light of information available, other preferences, needs, princi-
ples and standards, etc." John Ladd, The Use of Mechanical Methods for thl Solution
of Ethical Problems, in HUMAN VALUES AND ECONOMIC POLICY, supra note 15, at 157,
161. "The very act of examining one's own preferences is creative; it changes them by
clarifying, specifying, and structuring them." Id.
40 See ScrrovsKY, supra note 23, at vii. The theory of revealed preferences "enables
economists to look upon the consumer's actual behavior as a faithful reflection of his
preferences and, conversely, to regard his preferences as revealed by his behavior." Id.
On this theory and its implications "are based many of the economists' arguments, con-
clusions, recommendations." Id. Related is the doctrine of consumer sovereignty,
whereby economists believe "that every consumer is his own master, free to follow his
personal tastes and inclinations independently of other consumers' tastes and inclina-
tions, and that the economy can, at least in the realm of private goods, accommodate
different consumers' different tastes all at the same time." Id. at 7. This "is a gross
oversimplification." Id. The theory of revealed preferences notwithstanding, ascertaining
preferences by market behavior is problematic. See, e.g., BUCHANAN, supra note 12, at
26-27, 38-39 (one's revealed preference may not make one better off); Anderson, supra
note 27, at 58-59 ("For revealed preference theory can make claims only about what
people choose, not about how they view their choices."); John G. Bennett, Ethics and
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identically situated economically, choose to allocate their re-
sources differently can be fully justified as a reflection of their
dissimilar tastes or preferences. Discount schedules, risk atti-
tudes, and psychic income may be matters of taste, but the term
is used more broadly by economists.41 Again, it is often a wild
card played to explain the otherwise inexplicable. 2  Further-
Markets, 14 PHnI & PuB AFF. 195, 199-203 (1985) (individual uncertainties about prefer-
ence orderings, effects of circumstances, and preferences based on impulse, ignorance, or
confusion about aims); Harrison, supra note 33, at 1312-13, 1351-62 (the decisionmaking
process often distorts the perception of preferences); Mark Kelman, Choice and Utility,
1979 Wis. L REv. 769 (criticizing neoclassical views that one cannot tell whether con-
sumer choices lead to well-being and that choosers actually are satisfied with their
choices); Gail Kennedy, Social Choice and Policy Formation, in HUMAN VALUES AND EC-
ONOMIC POLICY, supra note 15, at 140, 142 ("Any attempt to discriminate between that
which is in fact valued and that which upon reflection might be found either valuable or
the contrary is ignored."); Ernst Nagel, Preference, Evaluation, and Reflective Choice,
in HUMAN VALUEs AND ECONOWC POLICY, supra note 15, at 73, 78 ("[Elconomic theory
does not differentiate between such consumers [who reflectively form their preferences]
and those whose preferences are uninformed by any knowledge of the likely conse-
quences of alternative choices but are the expressions of unreflective impulse.").
41 Becker implies that tastes or preferences underlie "the production of commodities
such as 'good health', children, marriage, or 'intercity visits'," as well as "concepts such
as envy, prestige, physical and psychological health, 'circumspectne.s', and so
on-notions often grappled with by sociologists and psychologists." Gary S. Becker, On
the New Theory of Consumer Behavior, in THE EcoNomc APPROACH To HusAN Bmay-
ioR, supra note 14, at 131, 147-48. Scitovsky refers to people's tastes as "the way they
spend their money and arrange their lives." ScrrovsKn, supra note 23, at vi. That prefer-
ences are, in fact, not just self-regarding, see supra note 34.
42 Stigler and Becker begin a famous article: "The venerable admonition not to
quarrel over tastes is commonly interpreted as advice to terminate a dispute when it has
been resolved into a difference of tastes, presumably because there is no further room for
rational persuasion." George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Dispu-
tandum, 67 AM. ECON. REv. 76, 76 (1977). The "assumptions of differences in tastes ...
along with assumptions of unstable tastes, have been a convenient crutch to lean on
when the analysis has bogged down." Id. at 89. They provide "ad hoc arguments that
disguise analytical failures." Id. See also Becker, supra note 41, at 133 ('variations in
tastes ... are the portmanteau in the demand curve"); Alexander Rozenberg, Prospects
for the Elimination of Tastes from Economics and Ethics, Soc. Piu. & POL'y (Spring
1985) at 48, 53 ("Any actual choice can be accommodated to the conventional theory of
consumer behavior because of the indeterminacy of the preferences that give rise to it.").
Becker reacts to this role of tastes in "explaining" behavior. "For economists to rest a
large part of their theory of choice on differences in tastes is disturbing since they admit-
tedly have no useful theory of the formation of tastes, nor can they rely on a well-devel-
oped theory of tastes from any other discipline in the social sciences, since none exists."
Becker, supra note 41, at 133. For examples, see id. at 133-34. As an alternative he ad-
vances the "household production function approach" to consumption theory, though
under this approach tastes or preferences remain a factor. See id. at 134-37. Along this
line Stigler and Becker recommend, on the basis of the standard of useful predictiveness,
that the economist not stop when faced with matters of taste, but, maintaining the as-
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more, taking tastes as a given and assuming individuals act ra-
tionally to satisfy them "overlook[] the fact that tastes are
highly variable, easily influenced by example, custom, and sug-
gestion, constantly changed by the accumulation of experience,
and modified by changing prices and the availability of some
satisfactions and the unavailability of others. '43 Finally, while
tastes are not all morally neutral, economic analysis is unable to
distinguish between socially acceptable and unacceptable ones,
such as a taste for prejudice."
sumption of stability and similarity in tastes, "continue[] to search for differences in
prices or incomes to explain any differences or changes in behavior." Stigler & Becker,
supra, at 76. For further examination of Becker's concerns about intrapersonal changes
in preferences and interpersonal differences in them, with a bleak prognosis, see Rosen-
berg, supra.
'1 ScrrovsKy, supra note 23, at 5. "It also overlooks the possibility that the same
influences that modify our tastes might also modify our ability to derive satisfaction
from the things that cater to our tastes." Id. This famous book by Scitovsky contains a
sustained analysis of tastes or preferences and criticism of its role in economic theory. To
similar effect, see, e.g., JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 152-60 (1958)
("the dependence effect"); JOSEPH A SCHUMPTERm, CAPrrALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY
257-58 (3d ed. 1950) (advertising); C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Anal-
ysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & Pun. AFF. 3, 32-41 (1975) (market influence on values) [hereinafter
Ideology]; C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected
Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 741, 785-804 (1986) ("market determination") [hereinafter
Property]; Cass R. Sunstein, Disrupting Voluntary Transactions, in MARKETS AND JUS-
TIcE, supra note 4, at 279, 282-83 (preferences are "endogenous to, or a function of, con-
sumption patterns, legal rules, and social pressures most generally"). For other criticism,
see, e.g., David Braybrooke, Skepticism of Wants, and Certain Subversive Effects of
Corporations on American Values, in HUMAN VALUES AND ECONOMIC POLICY, supra note
15, at 224; Sunstein, supra note 28, at 1138-69 (cataloging the reasons for rejecting the
view that private preferences are autonomous); see also Gordon G. Winston, The Rea-
sons for Being of Two Minds: A Comment on Schelling's "Enforcing Rules on Oneself,"
1 J.L. & EcoN. ORG. 375, 377-78 (1985) (discussing various causes of internally conflicting
preferences). For a technical examination, see Peter J. Hammond, Changing Tastes and
Coherent Dynamic Choice, 43 REv. ECON. STUD. 159 (1976).
4" See Richard S. Markovitz, Legal Analysis and the Economic Analysis of Alloca-
tive Efficiency, 8 HoFSTrA L. REV. 811, 873 (1980) ("Since economics is insensitive to the
prejudice-taste distinction, it cannot provide an algorithm for legal analysis where this
distinction is concerned."). That preferences are not givens beyond social appraisal, see,
e.g., Rationality, supra note 38, at 40-44 (common sense allows rational assessment of
some preferences); Mark Sagoff, Values and Preferences, 96 ETHICS 301, 302-05 (1986)
(public values diverge from private preferences); Sunstein, supra note 28, at 1173 (the
legal system should examine private preferences). Society obviously draws the line some-
where, such as at malice. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 101-04 (1984)
(desires must be minimally intelligible and correct); Bailey Kuklin, Punishment: The
Civil Perspective of Punitive Damages, 37 CLrv. ST. L. REv. 1, 18-20 (1989) ("malice"
subjects a person to punitive damages); Sunstein, supra note 28, at 1129-30 ("[I]t is
difficult to understand much of private and public law without questioning the assump-
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E. Transaction Costs
Transaction costs, 45 which include opportunity costs,40 in-
formation costs,47 and administrative costs, 48 can be used as an-
tion that private preferences must always be regarded as sovereign.").
4 For a definition of transaction costs, see supra text accompanying note 12. Polin-
sky offers a more expansive definition. "In general, transaction costs include the costs of
identifying the parties with whom one has to bargain, the costs of getting together with
them, the costs of the bargaining process itself, and the costs of enforcing any bargain
reached." A. MITCHELL PoLiNsKy, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMCS 12 (2d ed.
1989). See also Cooter, supra note 1, at 16 (similarly expansive definition); Ellickson,
supra note 1, at 614-16 ("A Taxonomy of Transaction Costs"). Related to transaction
costs is strategic behavior, whereby bargainers vie for shares of the fruits of their cooper-
ation. See Jules L. Coleman, Economics and the Law: A Critical Review of the Founda-
tions of the Economic Approach to Law, 94 ETHIcs 649, 664-67 (1984). The Cease theo-
rem can be criticized for neglecting strategic behavior, eg., threats and bluffs, that
jeopardizes cooperation. See id.
"' "The costs of inputs to a firm are their values in their most valuable alternative
uses." EDWIN MANSFIELD. NICROECONOIC& THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 163 (3d ed. 1979)
(the alternative or opportunity cost doctrine). The input discussed here is the time and
other costs of acquiring information, presumptively unnecessary in the ideal market.
While "[a] basic principle of economic thinking is that opportunity costs and out-of-
pocket costs should be treated alike," psychological experiments demonstrate that
whether the costs are framed as discounts or surcharges affects their perceived value.
Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 20, at 67, 76-77.
"I Information costs, as suggested by Becker, can also be used as a wild card. "The
assumption that information is often seriously incomplete because it is costly to acquire
is used in the economic approach to explain the same kind of behavior that is explained
by irrational and volatile behavior, or tradition behavior, or 'nonrational' behavior in
other discussions." Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, in
THE ECoNobic APPROACH TO Hu ,AN BEHAVIOR, supra note 14, at 3, 7. He goes on:
When an apparently profitable opportunity to a firm, worker, or household is
not exploited, the economic approach does not take refuge in assertions about
irrationality, contentment with wealth already acquired, or convenient ad hoc
shifts in values (i.e., preferences). Rather it postulates the existence of costs,
monetary or psychic, of taking advantage of these opportunities that eliminate
their profitability-costs that may not be easily "seen" by outside observers.
Of course, postulating the existence of costs closes or "completes" the eco-
nomic approach in the same, almost tautological, way that [is done in the
physical and biological sciences]. The critical question is whether a system is
completed in a useful way ....
Id. But what if the profitable opportunity actually is not exploited because of irrational-
ity, contentment with wealth already acquired, or shifts in values? These reasons may
have normative significance. Whereas usefulness is fully satisfactory as a touchstone for
physical and biological scientific theory, fairness also is relevant to human interactions.
For example, if a choice is irrational, this may affect the chooser's moral responsibility.
Yet Becker would seem to have none of this. "Economists cannot resist the temptation
to hide their own lack of understanding behind allegations of irrational behavior, unnec-
essary ignorance, folly, ad hoc shifts in values, and the like, which is simply aclmvledg-
ing defeat in the guise of considered judgment." Id. at 11-12 (examples following).
Becker himself does resist the temptation. See id. at 14. Let us not acknowledge defeat
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other economic wild card.49 For example, why does the consumer
fail to undertake a simple investigation into the value of particu-
lar goods or the dependability of the merchant? It is not because
she is irrational, but rather because of the opportunity costs in-
volved. She values her leisure time more than the rationally ex-
pected payoff from the investigation." That she may save hun-
dreds of dollars in twenty minutes by phoning ten merchants for
price quotations, only shows that she highly values her twenty
minutes of leisure. 51
too quickly, but then again, let us not smugly claim sufficient understanding when nor-
mative factors are neglected. Elster turns the claim of being ad hoc against Becker's
position. He notes that the general problem with the principle of charity as defined,
infra note 99, is "that so many of its gambits involve ad hoc reasoning perilously close to
tautologies. To postulate costs of information, costs of transaction, psychic costs or dif-
ferent time perspectives just to make the behavior fit the theory is an unacceptable way
out." ELSTER, supra note 15, at 156. Elster believes "the ad hoc hypotheses should have
some independent predictive power." Id.
48 Notice that Buchanan implies that administrative costs differ from transaction
costs. See supra text accompanying note 12 (compare item 2 with 4(a)). Polinsky runs
them together. See supra note 45.
4' "No term in the philosopher's lexicon is more imprecisely defined than is the
economist's term 'transaction costs.' Almost anything counts as a transaction cost."
MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 261; Coleman, supra note 45, at 666; see also
Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation, and Liability Rules - A
Comment, 11 JL. & ECON. 67, 68 n.5 (1968) (questioning the meaning of transaction
costs); Cooter, supra note 1, at 16 ("The meaning of transaction costs is not well-stan-
dardized in the literature."); Schlag, supra note 1, at 929 (noting the concept of transac-
tion cost is usually "undefined and unlimited").
80 Since information is normally costly to acquire, the rational actor chooses to in-
vest in information more as the value of the decision increases, e.g., television versus
house purchase. The leading article is George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information,
69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). Notice that information costs may even be negative, i.e., a
positive benefit to the consumer. For example, the television purchaser who obtains
pleasure (i.e., psychic income) from reading technical and consumer magazines, and go-
ing from store to store looking at available models and talking to salespersons, may actu-
ally feel a letdown once the "chore" of the purchase is over. See infra text accompanying
notes 97-99.
"' Coase himself recognizes the need to account for transaction costs. "[W]hile con-
sideration of what would happen in a world of zero transaction costs can give us valuable
insights, these insights are, in my view, without value except as steps on the way to the
analysis of the real world of positive transaction costs." Ronald H. Coase, The Coase
Theorem and the Empty Core: A Comment, 24 J.L. & ECON. 183, 187 (1981). The "more
complicated version of the Coase Theorem" faces up to the fact that positive transaction
costs may curtail the efficiency of a particular legal rule. "In these circumstances, the
preferred legal rule is the rule that minimizes the effects of transaction costs. These
effects include actually incurring transaction costs as well as the inefficient choices in-
duced by a desire to avoid transaction costs." POLINSKY, supra note 45, at 13. For an
interesting analysis and use of the reciprocal nature of transaction costs, see Schlag,
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To summarize, the point is not that people do not vary in
their discount schedules, risk attitudes, psychic income, tastes,
and transaction costs. Rather, these wild cards can cover a mul-
titude of sins. In a just society, or at least in intellectually hon-
est discourse, the sins must be uncovered and counted."2
II. INDETERMINACIES
There are other soft spots in economic theory that dampen
the normative force of the market paradigm. The ones addressed
here are the indeterminacies that result from inexactitudes, un-
certainties, or symmetries in economic models. Specifically, they
relate to problems with utility functions, externalities, what-is-a-
cost-of-what, moralisms, and shadow markets. 3
A. Utility Functions
Economists usually assume that an economic actor aims to
maximize his utility function, which is the relationship between
the consumer's utility and the goods consumed." It "depends
only on his own consumption, and . . . determines all his
supra note 1, at 929-30, 953-56.
11 Posner responds to criticism stemming from unrealistic economic assumptions re-
garding human nature: "Rational choice in economics does not mean self-consciously ec-
onomic.choice, or even conscious choice. Economics ... is concerned with what people
do, not what they feel or think. To complain that economics doe3 not paint a realistic
picture of the conscious mind is to miss the point of economics .... " Richard A. Poner,
The Ethical Significance of Free Choice: A Reply to Professor West, 99 HArv. L. RLv.
1431, 1439 (1986) (footnotes omitted). Au contraire, the point is not missed. To say
nothing about the effect of the market on feelings and thoughts, insofar as choices are
not reflective of what people feel or think, the Kantian and utilitarian justifications of
the market are undermined. Neither autonomy nor preference satisfaction are promoted.
Cf. PosNzR, supra note 4, chs. 3-4 (justifying the free market and wealth maximization
principles on autonomy grounds, i.e., ex ante consent).
For a sampling of other criticisms of economic theory, particularly as applied to
legal analysis, see Property, supra note 43, at 785-804 (arguing that the market structure
coercively determines the content of the social world, thereby limiting self-determina-
tion); Rizzo, supra note 30, at 641 (noting that the normative justification of common
law efficiency has unrealistically high information requirements); see generally Jutxs L
CoLEmAN, MARKS, MoRALs mD ThE LAw (1988); Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal
Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485 (1980).
"' See MANSFmIL, supra note 46, at 58 n.8. The meaning or significance of individ-
ual welfare or utility is debatable. See, e.g., SEN, supra note 4, at 38-51; G. A. Cohen, On
the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 Ermcs 906, 909-10 (1989) (corresponding to Sen
and Dworkin, distinguishing "hedonic welfare" from "preference satisfaction").
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choices. '55 When it comes to constructing an actual individual
utility function based on a person's established preferences,
economists are left at sea."' While experiments have been
designed to do this,57 their validity has been challenged.58
One reason actual utility functions may be indeterminable
is that individuals may not actually have stable preferences
which are consistently ordered.59 They may, in other words, be
economically irrational,60 notwithstanding the assumption to the
contrary. 1 Preferences are not independent of the setting, but
are themselves partially informed by the marketplace and other
environmental factors.2 They also change over time. 3 Even be-
"5 SEN, supra note 4, at 80 (specifying the features of the "complex structure of
'self-interested behavior'" of a utility function). "Each actor seeks to maximize an index
known as a utility function, whose value depends on the vector (list) of goods possessed
by that actor." MARGOLIS, supra note 31, at 6; cf. Frank H. Knight, Science, Philosophy,
and Social Procedure, in FREEDOM AND REFORM 205, 207 (1947) ("The economic man
may only in a rather unrealistic sense be said to work, and he does not play; he maxi-
mizes satisfaction, subject to the condition of the 'resources' at his command.").
"' See James G. March, Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of
Choice, in RATIONAL CHOICE 142, 153-54 (Jon Elster ed., 1986); Rosenberg, supra note 42,
at 48; Sen, supra note 34, at 323-24.
See MANSFIELD, supra note 46, at 60-61 (describing an experimental study).
' "Evidence that consumers actually distribute their purchases in such a way as to
maximize their utilities, and hence to equate marginal utilities, is nonexistent." 2 Her-
bert A. Simon, Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, in MODELS OF
BOUNDED RATIONALITY, supra note 14, at 474, 477. To the contrary, Simon points to evi-
dence from experiments which refute the premise that the substance of people's choices
maximizes their subjective expected utility. "What has been shown is that they do not
even behave as if they had carried out those calculations, and that result is a direct
refutation of the neoclassical assumptions." Id. at 488. See also Morgenstern, supra note
14, at 1167-69 (discussing the theoretical difficulties with application of revealed prefer-
ence theory); Alex Y. Seita, Common Myths in the Economic Analysis of Law, 1989
B.Y.U. L. REv. 993, 1017 n.77 (noting the difficulty of researching preference changes).
59 See supra note 43 and accompanying text; see generally Ronald de Sousa, Ra-
tional Homunculi, in THE IDENTITIES OF PERSONS 217 (Am6lie 0. Rorty ed., 1976).
60 For economic rationality, see supra note 15.
61 Becker explains the basis of the assumption partially as a means to avoid a wild
card: "The assumption of stable preferences provides a stable foundation for generating
predictions about responses to various changes, and prevents the analyst from suc-
cumbing to the temptation of simply postulating the required shift in preferences to
'explain' all apparent contradictions to his predictions." Becker, supra note 47, at 5. The
assumption is one of the keystones: "The combined assumptions of maximizing behavior,
market equilibrium, and stable preferences, used relentlessly and unflinchingly, form the
heart of the economic approach as I see it." Id. The assumption that preferences can be
taken as a given is criticized in the topic "tastes." See supra notes 38-44 and accompany-
ing text.
2 See supra note 43; MANSFIELD, supra note 46, at 71-72 (determinants of tastes
and preferences); John Rawls, A Well-Ordered Society, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND So-
ciTY 6, 9 (Peter Laslett & James Fishkin eds., 5th series 1979) ("the social system
shapes the desires and aspirations of its members").
63 See, e.g., MYRDAL, supra note 4, at 16; Brandt, supra note 15, at 22, 29-30;
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yond this, when examining the social goal of individual prefer-
ence satisfaction, the proposition that people generally know
what is best for themselves has been questioned."'
To overcome some of the problems with utility functions,
economists have embraced the notion of Pareto superiority and,
derivatively, optimality,65 which avoid the need of utility mea-
surements, or at least of interpersonal utility comparisons."8
Thomas C. Schelling, Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational
Choice, 74 AiL EcoN. REV. 1, 5 (1984)(Papers & Proc.); see also GOODN, supra note 22.
at 41-47 (periodic preference changes).
" See Kuklin, supra note 11, at 666-69 nn.36 & 44. The challenge extends to
whether, even if people know what is best for themselves, they choose it. See supra note
34.
The criterion of Pareto superiority may be defined. "One state of the world, S1, is
Pareto superior to another, S... if and only if no one prefers S to S1 and at least one
person prefers S1 to S." MUNRPHY & CoLmAN, supra note 5, at 213. Pareto optimality,
derived from superiority, is: "Si is Pareto optimal if and only if there exists no S,, such
that Sn is Pareto superior to Si." Id. Pareto superiority is also referred to as the "Pareto
condition", see, e.g., Paul Seabright, Social Choice and Social Theories, 18 PHIL. & PuB.
AFF. 365, 368 n.6 (1989) (providing versions of the "Pareto condition"), and the "Pareto
principle", see Arrow, supra note 15, at 15. Akin to the Pareto criteria, particularly supe-
riority, is the Kaldor-Hicks criterion: "One state of affairs (E') is Kaldor-Hicks efficient
to another (E) if and only if those whose welfare increases in the move from E to E'
could fully compensate those whose welfare diminishes with a net gain in welfare." Jules
L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HoSTRA L Ray. 509, 513
(1980). "Under Kaldor-Hicks, compensation to losers is not in fact paid." Id. For the
various notions of efficiency in law and economics, see generally BucHANAN, supra note
12, at 4-13; Coleman, supra note 1, at 206-31. See also SFN, supra note 4, at 21 n.20
(laying out the two main definitions: "technical efficiency" and "economic efficiency,"
i.e., Pareto optimality); David D. Friedman, Does Altruism Produce Efficient Outcomes?
Marshall Versus Kaldor, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1988) (defining "Marshall efficiency").
Kennedy complains that efficiency can be given such a capacious definition that it be-
comes easily manipulable for political purposes. See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and
Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special References to Compul-
sory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. Rav. 563, 587 (1982); see also
SEN, supra note 4, at ch. 2 (lamenting the impoverishment of welfare economics by its
reliance on economic efficiency); Frank L Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and
Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. Cm. L Rav. 307, 309 (1979) (" 'Efficiency' is too loose
and evocative a term for scientific usage .... 9.
"See BucHANAN, supra note 12, at 7; Coleman, supra note 45, at 649 ("[TIhe most
basic notion in the [law and economic] analysis--efficiency or Pareto optimality-was
originally introduced to solve the interpersonal comparability problem of classical utilita-
rianism."); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in
Common Law Adjudication, 8 HoFSTRA L. REv. 487, 488 (1980). Whether Pareto op-
timality actually finesses interpersonal utility comparisons is disputable. See Coleman,
supra note 65, at 515; Morgenstern, supra note 14, at 1169. So is the similar claim about
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Under the Pareto criteria, to determine if a move in the market-
place is superior, all the parties affected by it must consent.
Their consent presumably indicates that they have achieved per-
sonal utility gains. As it turns out, this is far from a perfect solu-
tion. Critics of reliance on Pareto superiority object to its neg-
lect of social values.6 7 Another fundamental issue is whether
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. See Friedman, supra note 65, at 2. That interpersonal utility
comparisons are problematic, see, e.g., BUCHANAN, supra note 12, at 7-8 (with criticism);
Wilfred Harrison, Introduction to JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND
AN INTRODUCTION To THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ii n.2 (Wilfred Harri-
son ed., 1948) (1st ed. Oxford 1823); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
345-46 (2d ed. 1977). The reluctance of economists to compare interpersonal utilities
may be due to the influence of logical positivism, see SEN, supra note 4, at 30-31; Seab-
right, supra note 65, at 371 n.13, or to "a cautious positivistic view of the capacity and
reliability of human speculative reason, intuition, and insight," Michelman, supra note
65, at 313. "Many economists even today are uneasy about making interpersonal compar-
isons of welfare, even though most policy-making depends implicitly upon doing so." Id.
That policymakers realistically have little choice but to make the comparisons, and do,
see, e.g., BARRY, supra note 15, at 44-52; GOODIN, supra note 22, at 16-18, 246; IAN M.D.
LITTLE, A CRITIQUE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS 52-53 (2d ed. 1957); Arrow, supra note 15, at
19-20 (examining the "principle of extended sympathy").
67 See, e.g., BUCHANAN, supra note 12, at 4-13 (extensive criticism); SCOTT GORDON,
WELFARE, JUSTICE, AND FREEDOM 202 (1980) (Paretianism leaves out the primary social
good of freedom); Knight, supra note 55, at 222 (arguing the natural long-run tendency
of the invisible hand "is in many respects evil" because it fosters "the corruption of
men's wants in the large sense... [and] the cumulative growth of inequality in economic
power."); AmARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTwE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 78-88 (1970)
(Pareto principle conflicts with liberal values); Baker, supra note 43, at 27-41 (question-
ing the adequacy of the values promoted by efficiency); Bruce Chapman & John Quinn,
Efficiency, Liberty and Equality: Three Ethical Justifications for Regulatory Reform,
20 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 512, 518 (1982) ("[The essential steps in even strictly Pareto
superior reallocations of resources in markets based on money exchange are as likely as
not to involve reductions in total welfare."); Gibbard, supra note 8, at 404-05 (normative
considerations are disavowed by Paretianists); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis
of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REv. 387, 388 (1981) (arguing efficiency
criterion for rules is "incoherent" and "indeterminate," thus requiring controversial
value judgments); Frank I. Michelnan, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory
of Law, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1015, 1035 (1978) ("Explanatory [economic] theorists ... must
exclude from the calculus of pure efficiency all possibility of private preferences for prin-
ciples of right or social justice as such."); Morgenstern, supra note 14, at 1169-70 (after
several criticisms of the theory, concluding that "[c]learly the notion of the Pareto opti-
mum must be used with extreme caution"); Nino J. Rizzo, Uncertainty, Subjectivity,
and the Economic Analysis of Law, in TIME, UNCERTAINTY, AND DISEQUILMRIUM 71 (Nino
J. Rizzo ed., 1979) (among other things, the notion of efficiency is "hopelessly clouded in
ambiguity" and that the common law promotes it is "internally inconsistent"); Lawrence
G. Sager, Pareto Superiority, Consent, and Justice, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 913, 914-30
(1980) (dissociation of Pareto superiority and justice); Sagoff, supra note 44, at 308-10
("Pareto improvement is [not] necessarily a moral improvement"); Sen, supra note 37, at
132 (conflict of liberal values and Pareto principle). Coleman has been particularly dev-
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one's "consent" can be considered morally sufficient when one
contemplates the many factors that prevent the making of a
fully rational choice in the marketplace, such as the lack of com-
plete information and equal bargaining power."'
B. Externalities
Efficient Pareto superior moves are unlikely to occur unless
all the costs and benefits of a transaction are internalized. In the
absence of third-party effects, when costs and benefits are fully
internalized, the price of the goods reflects the true social costs,
thereby forcing the parties to take them into account."' Other-
wise, when there are externalities, the transactors may blithely
ignore these social costs and, for example, consummate the
transaction even though it is inefficient because the transaction
imposes diffuse costs on third parties greater than the benefits
to the transacting parties. Therefore, among the assumptions of
the ideal market is that there are no externalities." Insofar as
astating in his attacks on Paretianism, including the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. See COLE-
mAN, supra note 53, at 545-48; MuRPHY & C0L tAN, supra note 5, at 267-72; Coleman,
supra note 45, at 649-79; Coleman, supra note 27, at 1130; Coleman, supra note 1, at
223-26.
Is See generally Kukln, supra note 13. Posner defends his wealth maximization
principle or the Kaldor-Hicks criterion with a Kantian, ex ante consent argument. See
Posner, supra note 66, at 488.97. For criticism of Posner's argument, see, e.g., Ronald
Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, in A MTrERa OF PRNcIPLE 237 (1985); Lucian A. Bebchuk,
The Pursuit of a Bigger Pie: Can Eueryone Expect a Bigger Slice?, 8 Hoi'sn. L. Rnv.
671, 688-94 (1980) (with suggested improvements); Chapman & Quinn, supra note 67, at
513-21; Coleman, supra note 45, at 671-77; Coleman, supra note 65, at 5314%; Coleman,
supra note 27, at 1127-31; Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HoFsTFA L. Ray. 563,
573-90 (1980); Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 227, 23942 (1980); Malloy, supra note 2, at 240-54; Ernest J. Weinrib,
Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 30 U. ToRoNrro L.J. 307 (1980); Robin
West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice. The Role of Consent in the Moral and Politi-
cal Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HAnv. L Rv. 384, 400 (1985) (posit-
ing that consent often comes from the desire to submit to authority, not to maximize
well-being or autonomy). Coleman also rejects the claim that the Pareto criteria are de-
fensible on consent or liberty grounds. See Coleman, supra note 65, at 540-48. Others
object to the warrant of Pareto superiority on consent grounds See BucHANAN, supra
note 12, at 12-13; Sager, supra note 67, at 935-37.
" The two tasks of "any acceptable allocative mechanism" are: "firstly, that infor-
mation must be generated about all the benefits of employing resources in alternative
uses, and secondly, that persons be motivated to take account of this information." Har-
old Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. & EcoN. 11, 16
(1964). Internalization conveys the information and forces persons to take it into ac-
count. See, e.g., GuIDo CAIREs, THE CosTs OF AccDENm 69-73 (1970).
11 For a definition of an externality, see supra text accompanying note 12 (item
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there are, the marketplace, realistically having transaction costs,
will fail to assure Pareto superiority and optimality.71 Unfortu-
nately, externalities exist for large classes of transactions, per-
haps most of them. 2 Since not all costs and benefits are inter-
nalized,73 in Posner's words, "the Pareto-superiority criterion is
useless for most policy questions.'74
C. What-Is-A-Cost-Of- What
Before complaining about the inefficiency caused by the
failure to internalize costs and benefits, one must be able to
identify an externality. What costs and benefits are properly
ascribed to a particular good? For example, is it a cost of owning
a farm that occasionally sparks from the bordering railroad's en-
gines will ignite the nearby crops, or is it a cost of owning a rail-
road that occasionally the nearby farm crops will be ignited by
the engines' sparks? 75 Determining, as Calabresi refers to the
question, what-is-a-cost-of-what, 6 suggests the answer to the
more important social question, namely, which party should in-
ternalize this cost? From a purely analytical point of view, there
is a symmetry to the problem.
4(b)); see generally MANSFMLD, supra note 46, at 372-74. The existence of externalities
"is inefficient, thus creating a potential cooperative surplus that can be distributed so as
to make each person better off." Coleman, supra note 12, at 82.
71 See Coleman, supra note 65, at 541 ("In the ideal world of noncoercive markets
free from transaction costs and third party effects, in which individuals are both rational
and knowledgeable, the exercise of liberty leads to Pareto-optimal states of affairs
through a series of Pareto-superior exchanges.").
72 See, e.g., MANSFIELD, supra note 46, at 372-74 (examples); cf. SEN, supra note 67,
at 79 ("Indeed the failure of the market mechanism to take note of 'externalities' is one
of the well-known deficiencies of the market system.").
73 Even if all costs could be internalized, one reason they are not despite the poten-
tial cooperative surplus, see supra note 70, is that the bargain over them is an exchange
having the payoff structure of the Prisoner's Dilemma. A prisoner's dilemma occurs
when two persons would be better off if they both reliably cooperated (e.g., neither pris-
oner rats on the other) but they rationally choose not to cooperate (e.g., both rat on each
other) because of the fear that the other will gain an advantage by not cooperating (e.g.,
one rats on the other and gets off with a light sentence while the other who does not rat
gets a heavy one). See Coleman, supra note 12, at 82.
7' Posner, supra note 66, at 489. Similar criticism may also be leveled against other
gambits resorted to in the attempt to cope with problems of achieving efficiency, such as
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. See, e.g., id. at 490-91; Coleman, supra note 1, at 237-42.
7' This example comes from Coase's original article. See Coase, supra note 1, at 29-
34.
7" See CALABREsI, supra note 69, at chs. 7 & 8. This stems from Coase who discusses
"the reciprocal nature of the problem." Coase, supra note 1, at 2.
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Under the Coase theorem determining what-is-a-cost-of-
what is ultimately irrelevant to the matter of resource allocation.
Under Coase's assumptions (e.g., zero transaction costs), the
person who stands to gain more will end up with her favored
resolution, if not by original entitlement, then by purchasing it
from the other party.7 Therefore, depending on which party
originally has the right in question and values the right more,
either the farmer will pay the railroad to stop emitting sparks,
or the railroad will pay the farmer to stop growing crops along
the railroad tracks. One way or another, the most valuable use
will result.
Even granting Coase his strong assumption that required
transactions will occur, while there may be no allocative effects
from externalities, there are distributive ones; the person with
the original entitlement will end up wealthier, either from being
paid for the entitlement by the other party, or in being free from
having to pay the other party for it. For example, when neigh-
bors claim that damage from smokestack pollution should be
considered a cost of the manufacturer's products, the symmetri-
cal counterclaim is that the neighbors' pollution harms should
be treated as a cost to the neighbors of living in modem times in
industrial areas.7 8 Under a regime that requires the polluter to
internalize the costs of pollution either by paying for pollution
damage to the neighbors, or by installing pollution control de-
vices, the pollutees end up better off. Under a contrary regime,
the polluter ends up better off. The proper response to the re-
ciprocal claims is neither self-evident nor resolved by Coase's
analysis. Instead, it is political. What-is-a-cost-of-what is de-
clared by the body politic based on economic and moral policy
considerations, history, etc.79 In the end, the economic analysis
7 See Coase, supra note 1, at 2-8. But Coase took note of transaction costs and
recognized that, in some circumstances, government intervention may be efcient See
id. at 15-19.
78 For environmental impacts of this sort, one commentator advances a "responsibil-
ity principle," distinguishing between the actor and the acted upon, which is claimed to
offer an asymmetric answer, Coase notwithstanding. See Talbot Page, Responsibility,
Liability, and Incentive Compatibility, 97 ETmIcs 240 (1986). As one might suspect,
under this principle the polluter, not the pollutee, is responsible.
For accidents, Calabresi espouses the "general deterrence or market approach" to
risk distribution to achieve "primary accident cost avoidance." See CALAnnxw, supra
note 69, at 20-21. This approach, based on policies favoring efficiency, "would require
allocation of accident costs to those acts or activities (or combinations of them) which
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becomes blurred by the required normative judgment that
controls.80
D. Moralisms
As seen in the discussion of what-is-a-cost-of-what, there is
a moral component to social choices that at first glance may
seem merely analytical. This component, broadly speaking, may
be called moralisms5s Moralisms are public goods that "do not
lend themselves to collective measurement which is acceptably
objective and nonarbitrary. ' ' 2 Measurement problems aside, ec-
onomic analysis tends to neglect a broad range of social values. 3
If the law relies exclusively on efficiency considerations, it will
inadequately account for basic normative questions, such as the
could avoid the accident costs most dheaply." Id. at 135 (footnote omitted). Along with
the general deterrence approach, Calabresi advances the specific deterrence approach
that attacks the problem of cost reduction differently. Under this one, there are "not
only collective decisions as to which acts or activities are responsible for accidents, but
also collective decisions regarding the tolerable level of accident costs in light of the
activities that must be given up to reduce accident costs." Id. at 174. In addition to the
economic values revealed in the market, also appraised are the nonmarket moral values
of activities affected by the reduction of accident costs. "While general deterrence seeks
the 'cheapest' way of reducing accident costs, specific deterrence may be said to seek the
'best' way of reducing them." Id. at 175. For the difficulty in determining the "best" way
of reducing costs-often harder than finding the "cheapest" way, see id. at 176-97.
80 Kennedy emphasizes this indeterminacy in attacking the use of economic analysis
by liberals. See Kennedy, supra note 67, at 393-400. Schlag shows that transaction costs
also raise the question of what-is-a-cost-of-what. See Schlag, supra note 1, at 929-30.
81 While Calabresi discusses the moral component of what-is-a-cost-of-what under
"specific deterrence", see supra note 79, for analytical purposes he excludes considera-
tion of some moral principles, such as justice, that put into issue the fairness of the
particular accident system. See CALABREsi, supra note 69, at 100-02. Though he brings in
the broadest moral principles later, see id. at pt. V, I lump together all these principles
under the label "moralism."
82 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1111 (1972).
63 For instance, Baker observes that the competitive market forces firms to respond
in kind to efficiency-increasing techniques, "even if the technique is objectionable to con-
sumers, workers, capitalists, and managers of other firms .... The social world thus
created may not reflect the preferences of any of these interested parties." Baker, supra
note 43, at 789. As an example, Baker turns to health preferences, though the preserva-
tion of health is not entirely a moralism because it has objectively measurable aspects.
"[M]arket competition forces cigarette companies to try to increase demand for their
product, even if the owners, managers, and workers all recognize that smoking is un-
healthy and should be discouraged." Id. at 789-90. For a fuller examination of the moral
overtones of smoking, see Robert E. Goodin, The Ethics of Smoking, 99 ETHICS 574
(1989).
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tradeoff between efficiency and equality, or allocational versus
distributional goals.'"
E. Shadow Markets
Economists attempt to monetize moralisms and other
"goods" for which no actual market exists by means of a shadow,
hypothetical or pseudo market. This is a conjectural market in
which the decisionmaker is relegated to estimating the valuation
in question. 5 The weakness of this ploy is that it is imprecise,80
arguably reflecting only the decisionmaker's "own beliefs about
how people should behave. ' 87 At their best, shadow markets are
" See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 68, at 264 (summarizing that wealth maximization
"makes no sense as a social goal, even as one among others"); AmTuR h. OKUN. EQUAL-
ITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975) (the pursuit of efficiency creates inequali-
ties); Kronman, supra note 68, at 240-42 (wealth maximization principle favors the ad-
vantaged, including "the arbitrary results of the natural lottery"); Malloy, supra note 2,
at 245 (Posner's framework favors the rich); Rizzo, supra note 30, at 644 ("moralisms,"
such as relational and distributional goals, are excluded); White, supra note 1, at 595-99
(Coase policy tends to redistribute wealth to the economically advantaged); but see
George J. Stigler, Two Notes on the Coase Theorem, 99 YALE LJ. 631, 632-33 (1989)
(Under the Coase theorem, "[a] stable property or tort law ... would not affect the
distribution of income."). Regarding the general normativity of economics, see infra note
124. In a recent reexamination of his principle of wealth maximization, Posner finds him-
self "slightly more sympathetic to some of the criticisms than I once was-but only
slightly more." Posner, supra note 9, at 85. He acknowledges situations in which the
principle offers no guidance. See, e.g., id. at 92-93, 100-01. He believes, however, that
these situations are rare, and "not a fatal limitation." Id. at 93.
Shadow prices, for example, "refer to the prices society would assign in perfect
markets to commodities for which, in reality, no market exists." Rizzo, supra note 30, at
643 n.5. "Prices, be they the money prices of the market sector or the 'shadow imputed
prices of the nonmarket sector, measure the opportunity cost of using scarce resources,
and the economic approach predicts the same kind of response to shadow prices as to
market prices." Becker, supra note 47, at 6. Posner's wealth-maximization principle re-
lies heavily on hypothetical markets. See PosNRa, supra note 4, at 60-65. For examples
of arguments based on shadow or hypothetical markets, see Gary S. Becker, On the In-
teraction Between the Quantity and Quality of Children, in THE EcoNomc APFROACH
To HuLmN BERAvioR, supra note 14, at ch. 10 (noting shadow price of children affects
demand); PosNE , supra note 4, at 61-62 (discussing the need for judicial estimations of
values when applying the Hand formula for negligence liability).
" See Rizzo, supra note 30, at 646-47; Weinrib, supra note 68, at 319-25. Particu-
larly in valuing a moralism as revealed and priced through the common law, "[tihere is
no way.., to stand outside of the law and see how it measures up against an external
standard." Rizzo, supra note 30, at 646; but see PosNER, supra note 4, at 79 (Though
interpersonal utility comparisons are rightly "anathema to the modem economist... the
interpersonal comparison of values, in the economic sense, is feasible, although difficult,
even when the values are not being compared in an explicit market.").
87 Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE M RALITY 113, 131 (Stuart
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soft. These estimated factors are easily manipulated, discounted,
or ignored when considered along with the hard numbers of
more concretely determined market factors.
Thus, economic theory again faces formidable problems.
When these are confronted, the models show weaknesses both at
the edges and at the cores. These are where the controversies
rage, or should rage.
III. EFFICIENCY
The ideal world of the invisible hand is perfectly efficient.
Goods end up with those who value them most. What could be
wrong with this? In responding to this question, it is helpful to
examine the unrealistic assumptions of the market model, super-
rationality, cardinal versus ordinal valuation and the theory of
second best.
A. Unrealistic Assumptions of the Market Model
Once one backs away from the tautological finding of effi-
ciency which follows from the assumption that parties make per-
fectly rational choices, the actual flaws in the rationality ob-
served in the marketplace undermine this primary economic
goal."' In light of the unrealism of the assumed conditions of the
invisible hand, individual efficient choices are unlikely.89 For ex-
ample, some costs and benefits of goods are easy to perceive
Hampshire ed., 1978). For Dworkin's general criticism of this approach to discovering
preferences, see Ronald Dworkin, Can a Liberal State Support Art?, in A MAMR OF
PRINCIPLE, supra note 68, at 221.
" To take a look backwards, Coleman contends that rational choice theory cannot
even demonstrate that a market economy would emerge to begin with. See Coleman,
supra note 12, at 92.
"' In pursuing this idea, Kennedy gets specific: "Some examples of issues that deci-
sion makers often approach with efficiency motives are: whether there should be nondis-
claimable warranties attached to consumer goods in circumstances where consumers
can't cheaply acquire information that would allow them to assess product safety, and
sellers have incentives not to provide this information... ." Kennedy, supra note 65, at
573. A difficulty with the efficiency motive is that "an intervention grounded in efficiency
concerns will always.involve speculation about what the parties 'would have done' had
they not been prevented by transaction costs." Id.; see id. at 598-99, 651-54. While Ken-
nedy writes only of transaction costs, the other assumed conditions are also unrealisti-
cally strong. See supra note 12. Kennedy concludes that intervention "falls short of pa-
ternalism because the decision maker sees second-guessing as an unfortunate expedient
necessary only because of market imperfections, and will abandon an intervention if con-
vinced that the supposed beneficiaries don't want it." Id. at 573.
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(e.g., price tag and design), while others are difficult (e.g., pro-
spective repairs and dealer dependability). Because of the effect
of this on consumers, resources tend to be misallocated in favor
of competitive goods with relatively more unperceived costs and
more perceived benefits. To put it in distributive terms,
merchants of goods with higher discernible net advantages cap-
ture wealth from consumers as well as mrchants of competitive
goods with lower discernible advantages, irrespective of the true
nature of the goods.90
Defenders of the market model claim that the unrealism of
the assumed conditions is irrelevant to the usefulness of eco-
nomic theory. What counts is not realism, but, like Newton's
theory of gravity, whether the theory is predictive.' The impor-
90 See Kuklin, supra note 13, at 997-1003 (redistribution from consumer to
merchant). For the variables affecting this conclusion, see Kennedy, supra note 65, at
597-614. Whether the market is actually efficient "depends on empirical data that no one
ever seems to have ready at hand." Id. at 603. Despite the uncertainties regarding the
outcome of compulsory terms, because of the prohibitive transaction costs Kennedy
would have the decisionmaker, following "rough intuitive assessments," intervene for
distributive and efficiency motives. Id. at 614. At the same time, he severely criticizes
intervention because of inequality of bargaining power for distributive motives, see id. at
614-24, while advancing it, with qualms, for paternalistic motives. See id. at 624-49.
", See, e.g., Becker, supra note 47, at 7; Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Posi-
tive Economics, in EssAYs w Posrr=v EcoNo~ucs 3, 15, 41 (1953); Pos.sA% supra note
66, at 13; GEORGE J. STIGLER, TE TkEORY OF PRiCE 5-7 (4th ed. 1987); Lionel Robbins,
The Nature of Economic Generalizations, in PHiLosoPHY AND Ec No mc THEoRY, supra
note 37, at 36. Buchanan points out that, along with Pareto Optimality, "(t]he case for
the market on grounds of efficiency rests on... the assumption that actual (nonideal)
markets, or feasible modifications of actual markets, sufficiently approximate the effi-
ciency of the ideal market to make them preferable to nonmarket arrangements."
BucHAN, supra note 12, at 14. That there are prodigious obstacles to "intersystemic
efficiency comparisons." See id. at 36-46. Arguably, since people try to be rational,
"[tihus, although individuals are not perfectly rational (even in the narrow sense of eco-
nomic theory), and even though aggregate behavior may be significantly irrational (in a
deeper sense), it is nevertheless comprehensible that rational (narrow sense) models turn
out to work quite well over a considerable range of behavior." MANROLIS, supra note 31,
at 8. For criticism, see 2 Herbert A. Simon, Problems of Methodology - Discussion, in
MODELS OF BouNDED RATONALIY, supra note 14, at 369; 2 Herbert A. Simon, Rational
Decision Making in Business Organizations, in MODELS OF BouNDED R To.rNALrr, supra
note 14, at 474; Russell & Thaler, supra note 18, at 1074. "The predictions of the clasi-
cal and neoclassical theories and the policy recommendations derived from them must be
treated with the greatest caution." Simon, Rational Decision Making, supra, at 490. See
also Micheliman, supra note 67, at 1038 (noting that because of the lack of definitive
structure to the relations among the variables in the economic theory of law, "it displays
a certain flaccidity, a tincture of nonfalsflability .... "); Nagel, supra note 40, at 78-79
("A theory of rational consumer choice that stipulates ideally complete knowledge and
absence of any uncertainty may be a useful guide to omniscient beings; it is not obvi-
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tance of predictability may be conceded. Current invisible hand
economic models may well be predictive, and even more predic-
tive than any other available ones, e2 but still this is not enough.
Other considerations also count, such as fairness.9 3 Even if indi-
vidual foibles and disadvantages wash out from a bird's eye view
of the marketplace, 9' individuals have solid grounds on which to
object to being washed out. Some individuals, owing to their un-
avoidable positions in the marketplace, systematically come up
with the short straw for reasons independent of desert or claims
of rights.95 The overall aggregations of economic analysis allow
ously relevant to the problems of mortal men."). The positivistic approach to economics
has been sharply attacked. See generally HoLms & NELL, supra note 15 (subscribing to a
rationalist position); Christopher W. Morris, The Relation Between Self-Interest and
Justice in Contractarian Ethics, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 119, 130 (Spring 1988) (philosophers
of science widely criticizing Friedman's instrumentalist account of economic
assumptions).
92 For the challenger of current economic theory, Friedman throws down the gaunt-
let. Not only must the compared alternative theory be, ceteris paribus, more predictive,
but also "[t]he gains from greater accuracy, which depend on the purpose in mind, must
then be balanced against the costs of achieving it." Friedman, supra note 91, at 17. Let
us not forget that fairness is a benefit of applied theory, offsetting a decrease in predic-
tiveness. Friedman recognizes that "normative economics" does not necessarily coincide
with analytic economics, though the former is largely informed by the latter. See id. at 3.
7.
93 For hints of what follows, see supra note 67.
'4 Economists defend their neglect of psychological evidence of human irrationalities
with the response that they "'are interested in aggregate behavior and these individual
errors will wash out when we aggregate."' Russell & Thaler, supra note 14, at 1074.
Russell and Thaler counter: "Since the errors that have been identified are systematic
(i.e., in a predictable direction), this statement is just wrong." Id. Nor for individuals can
one say, under "a more subtle version of this idea," that "'[m]arkets will eliminate the
errors,'" since irrationality "is rarely fatal." Id. As to this first response, I go further.
Even if the individual errors wash out when aggregated, normative questions remain. For
example, as between persons on either side of the aggregated average, there are likely to
be distributive consequences, as where the unsophisticated subsidize the sophisticated,
or risk averters subsidize risk preferrers. This should not be ignored.
9" This point is largely of a deontological orientation. Irrespective of the usefulness
of economic theories, important questions of rights and justice are lost sight of. Chap-
man, for example, argues "that rights cannot be sensibly incorporated within any kind of
[Posnerian wealth] maximization framework .... ." Bruce Chapman, Individual Rights
and Collective Rationality: Some Implications for Economic Analysis of Law, 10 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 455, 455 (1982); see also Neil MacCormick, Law and Economics: Adam
Smith's Analysis, in LEGAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 103, 124-25 (1982) (showing
the economic approach to law inadequately justifies or explains rights); Lawrence H.
Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumen-
tal Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 617, 628-30 (1973) ("[T]he Coase-Calabresi approach
overlooks the structural complexity implicit in the problem of assigning rights when it
effectively reduces that problem to one of maximizing net total welfare."); Weinrib,
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important questions of fairness and other values to be lost in the
welter of impressive looking numbers churned out by formulas
that deal with only part of what should be of public concern. For
controversial issues, such as some environmental problems, the
formulas may even produce answers that are accurate to no sig-
nificant digits."
B. Superrationality
If one fails to account for the shortfalls in full rationality
behind an actual purchase, the finding that any choice is effi-
cient can be fully defended. For example, the consumer without
prior information who purchases a television set after looking at
a few models in a single store may be quite rational in a fairly
strong sense. She values her leisure highly and obtains no pleas-
ure from gathering information about goods so mundane. She
supra note 68, at 318-19 ("There are difficulties ... in ascertaining the status of rights
under wealth-maximization, the grounds for superiority of Posnerian rights to utilitarian
ones, and the relationship between rights and moral intuitions."). At least Kantian, "au-
tonomy rights" must not be (entirely) subordinated to the "utility rights" which promote
efficiency. For this distinction, see Mm DAN-CoHEN. RIGTs. PERSoNS, ANm ORGAMZA-
TIONS 60-61, 79-80 (1986); MuRPHY & CoLEmut, supra note 5, at 74-78. Abiding is the
"humane regard for ... the quality of individual life." JAbEs W. Hunsr. LAw AD MAR-
KETS IN UNITED STATES HISToRY 97 (1982) (in the context of constitutionalism). But even
shunting rights aside, insofar as economic theory presumes egoism, the question remains:
"[In what sense and to what extent would egoistic behavior achieve general good?" Sen,
supra note 34, at 321. In Weberian terms, the point is that the economic analysis, nar-
rowly conceived, is "substantively irrational." See MAx W zaK TAE TmEORY op SocULx
AND EcONOmUC ORGANIZATION 185-86 (A.M. Henderson & Talbott Parsons trans., 1947).
" Hook pinpoints objections to exclusive reliance on the invisible hand.
If human values are defined in terms merely of choice, the strength of which is
quantitatively measured by price, then to assert that the equilibrium estab-
lished in the uncontrolled market maximizes human welfare is to utter a stu-
pendous tautology. One must reflect on the consequences of the equilibrium
achieved-requiring so to speak a second-order judgment-in order to deter-
mine whether they adequately fulfill, in the light of the possible alternatives,
whatever human needs we reflectively conclude are essential to a good life in a
good society. The choices we make on a first-order level are not ultimate data.
They have a history behind them that depends on the way the market econ-
omy has functioned in the past. A whole library of social criticism has called
attention to the manifold ways-subtle and blatant-in which first-order
choices have been influenced by the operation of the market. A judgment
about the way in which the resources of a society should be organized cannot
be rationally evaluated by criteria that presuppose antecedent acceptance of
the market system.
Sidney Hook, Basic Values and Economic Policy, in Hum VALUES AND EcoNcC POL-
icY, supra note 15, at 246, 247.
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realizes her decision is made in the face of much risk and uncer-
tainty, but based on what she does know, she monetizes these
factors, determining the tradeoff to be worthwhile. 7 Hence, her
choice made with little detailed knowledge maximizes her own
utility. 8 This is perfectly rational even though she may have
gotten a lousy deal on a lousy set.99
To push the basic idea farther down the slippery slope, con-
sider another hypothetical. An urban homeowner in a residential
neighborhood justifiably claims his property values will suffer by
forty percent from the planned establishment next door of a gar-
bage landfill. In rebuttal, he is told that his preexisting reasona-
ble expectations are not dashed by this depreciation. When he
bought the home twenty years before, he knew that the urban
environment included many concentrated unpleasantries, both
extant and prospective. Waste, transportation, industrial, and
penal facilities may be among the more disruptive, but everyone
knew then and knows now that these must be accommodated for
the municipality to operate. To push farther, even the zoning
ordinance in place is no guarantee of freedom from future incon-
sistent use, for one must be oblivious to the political processes to
believe that zoning is not subject to change and exception. So far
the downside has been emphasized, but comparable upside pros-
pects can be mentioned, such as the creation of a park nearby,
or an urban renewal project down the street that increases the
fair market value of the entire neighborhood. Therefore, twenty
years ago, the homeowner rationally anticipated that his prop-
W That the rational response to risk and uncertainty leads to inefficient choices, see,
e.g., Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3
J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 262-72 (1974); Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the
Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 33-57, 63-71 (1982) (discussing avoidance
ploys when standard of punitive damages is uncertain); but see Duncan Kennedy &
Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711, 722-24,
758-62 (1980) (noting the effect of the response is an empirical question).
98 See supra text accompanying notes 45-51 (transaction costs). The term of art for
the idea is "rational ignorance." See Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of
the Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 43, 47 n.17 (1988).
However, when the cost of the information and its relative value for the contemplated
purchase is profoundly uncertain, the actor can hardly choose rationally in a strong
sense. See, e.g., GOODIN, supra note 22, at 17,7-79.
99 The assumption of rationality has been called a "principle of charity" whereby
"one should always assume, as a working hypothesis, the rationality of any given action,
however strange and unadapted it might appear to be at first glance." ELSTER, supra
note 15, at 154. For the ad hoc nature of the principle, see supra note 47.
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erty was likely to increase in value at about the same rate as
realty in general, but that there was some chance for more dra-
matic changes, upward or downward. Reasonable people expect
the unexpected, 100 and, for that matter, expect to be treated un-
fairly on occasion, even by rational people. 101 In the end, the
homeowner is told that the fates were unkind regarding his
house investment. Perhaps it will even out in the long run
("Have you thought about buying a lottery ticket?"). 1 0 2 In any
event, his reasonable expectations grounded on rational choice
of twenty years ago have not been improperly disappointed. He
certainly has no warrant for a legal claim because of the
landfill.10 3
This reasoning has run amuck.Y" At the top of the slope, it
is quite plausible-at the bottom, ludicrous. The points at which
poor choices become irrational and unlikely contingencies be-
come too attenuated to support contentions founded on reasona-
ble anticipation are far from obvious.10 5 Normative theories
based on rational choice need reins, as do their echos, theories
based on consent,10 6 or compensation.107
10 This is one of the reasons people purchase insurance. For an interesting analysis
of the reasons for purchasing insurance, other than owing to risk aversion, see Goldberg,
supra note 14, at 217-21.
101 See FREDERmCK SCHICK, HAVING REASONS 79 (1984).
10 The response that bad luck will be followed by good luck since things even out in
the long run is known as the "gambler's fallacy." See RIcHAR NISE= & LEE Ross,
HuMAN INFRENCE:- STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIU JUDGaEr 25 (1980); Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, in JUDG Nr UrmnE
UNcERTAnmY: HEuRSTICS AND BIASES, supra note 27, at 23, 24. This is a typical example
of irrationality when confronted with risk and uncertainty.
103 For an argument like this in the takings context, see Frank L Michelman, Prop-
erty, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensa-
tion Law," 80 HAnv. L REV. 1165, 1237-38 (1967).
104 I myself am not innocent of pushing rationality beyond the pale, though (some-
times) with tongue in cheek. See Kuklin, supra note 44, at 88 n.257, 93, 94 n.274; Kuklin,
supra note 11, at 658-61 ("consent").
105 For example, in addressing aspects of superrationality in the takings context,
Ackerman distinguishes the institutionalized, reasonable expectations of the Ordinary
Observer from the Comprehensive View of the Scientific Policy Maker. See BRucF A.
AcKEMuAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONsTrr=rroN 10-20 (1977). The expectations of
the Ordinary Observer arguably are the standard for takings, but, Ackerman contends, it
may be time for a reappraisal. See id. at ch. 7.
100 "Consent" arguments face the same slippery slope of superrationality. For exam-
ple, a criminal, by undertaking an illegal act, "consents" to the punishment. See, e4.,
ImmANUEL KANT, THE IErAPHscA ELEMES oF JUsTIcE 99-108 (John Ladd trans.,
1965) (1st ed. Konigsberg 1797); ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHiNG CRuUNAS 182
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C. Cardinal versus Ordinal Valuation
The blackbox of economic modeling finesses problems by
means of another clever move beyond that of the assumption of
ideal rationality: the personal valuation of particular goods.
Since the process of valuation typically involves, among other
things, the monetization of many intangible qualities and specu-
lative contingencies, how can a party determine the amount of
utility she will obtain from the goods? Economic theory avoids
this knotty issue of utility measurement with the weaker as-
sumption that an individual need not know exactly the personal
value of goods being considered (cardinal choice); one only must
compare goods and choose which one is relatively preferred over
the others (ordinal choice).108
(1975); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REv.
1193, 1213 (1985) (consent to "savagely cruel sentences"). For their overbreadth, sundry
consent theories ha'e been attacked on a number of fronts. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman,
The Foundations of Constitutional Economics, in MARKETS, MOALS AND TIlE LAW,
supra note 53, at 133 (efficiency); MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 267-72 (effi-
ciency); Judith J. Thomson, Imposing Risks, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK 173, 188-
91 (1986) (risk imposition); Dworkin, supra note 68, at 576-77 (Posner's argument for
consent to entrepreneurial losses); Charles Dyke, Freedom, Consent, and the Costs of
Interaction, in Is LAW DEAD? 134, 155-57 (Eugene V. Rostow ed., 1971) (social contract);
Alan H. Goldman, Toward a New Theory of Punishment, 1 LAW & PHIL. 57, 63-65
(1982) (criminal punishment); Peter Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and the Re-
lational Approach, 1988 ANN. SURv. Am. L. 139, 141-43 (informal relational and express
adhesive contracts). In sum, "[t]he difficulty with hypothetical consent arguments of this
[Posnerian] sort is that there are so many of them." Sagoff, supra note 44, at 307.
107 Posner espouses a compensation principle. For example, Posner argues that land-
owners in town A received ex ante compensation for losses owing to the movement of a
factory to another town since the price they originally paid for their property was proba-
bly discounted by the probability of the future factory departure. Just as for "consen-
sual" losses from losing lottery tickets, the gamble satisfies the Pareto principle. See
Posner, supra note 66, at 491-92; see also Richard A. Posner, Epstein's Tort Theory: A
Critique, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 457, 460-64 (1979) (good Samaritan tort obligation from ex
ante compensation). Correspondingly, Epstein argues that low-level nuisances are legally
allowable because, over time, everyone suffers and benefits from them, so that ultimately
persons gain under the rule by avoiding litigation and administrative costs. Particular
losses are compensated for by overall gains, thereby advancing efficiency overall. See
Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8
J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 82-85 (1979) ("live and let live" rule). For Kronman's discussion of
these and other comparable compensation arguments from Michelman, Fried and him-
self, see Kronman, supra note 68, at 236-39. For Coleman's criticism of Posner's theory
of consent and ex ante compensation, see Coleman, supra note 65, at 534-39.
"' For a brief introduction to the distinction between cardinal and ordinal utility,
see MANSFIELD, supra note 46, at 54-56. But notice that the modem assumption of ordi-
nal utility "does not mean that results based on the assumption of cardinal utility are
wrong." Id. at 55. In Arrow's words, it simply is that in consumer demand theory, "cardi-
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When the competitive goods being considered are similar,
the choice from an ordinal ranking probably coincides well with
the choice that would follow from accurate cardinal valuations of
each of the goods. In comparing apples to apples, for instance,
inspection and experience are usually enough to pick the right
apple. The chooser committed to an apple purchase does not
have to determine that apple A is worth 37.2 cents to her while
apple B is worth 34.9 cents to her. As a practical matter, her
misestimations of cardinal value will have little affect on her al-
location of resources. Even if she learned that she had somewhat
misestimated the value of each apple, she would still buy an ap-
ple, to be exact, apple A.
On the other hand, when one is comparing apples to or-
anges, more specifically, disparate substitute goods, inspection
and experience are usually not enough to make an accurate
choice. For example, for the chooser deciding among a television
set, a number of movie tickets, and the many other forms of en-
tertainment, the cardinal valuations are so difficult that even the
ordinal ranking may be beyond introspective ratiocination. The
goods are virtually incommensurable. 109 While the purchaser
nal utility had no explanatory power above and beyond ordinal." Arrow, supra note 15,
at 18.
"' Due to the difficulty of comparison, the assumption of transitivity may not be
satisfied. See SEN, supra note 4, at 63 n.5 ("The issue of 'commensurability', much dis-
cussed in ethics, seems to involve both... that of descriptive homogeneity of goods, and
that of consistent and complete overall ordering."); Arrow, supra note 15, at 6. I suspect
that the difficulty is greater for luxury goods than for necessaries because the experience
with the latter is broader and the range of substitute goods for them is narrower. For this
reason the example of the television set may be inapt. Everyone needs a television set; it
must be now considered a necessity. Thus, the important comparison may be of different
sets and not to other forms of entertainment. Perhaps for a second or third set wider
substitute goods become relevant. Posner believes that incommensurability is not an in-
surmountable problem even for "soft" goods such as moral values. See, e.g., Pos ,
supra note 66, at 101-04, 185-88 (love, honesty, selflessness, charity, neighborliness, etc.);
PosNpa supra note 4, at 79 (quoted supra note 86). Other commentators have serious
doubts. See, e.g., I KENNmrH E. BOULDING, EcoNomc AN..ss 9 (4th ed. 1966) ("the
economist... cannot claim jurisdiction over the great region of valuation where such
imponderable realities as friendship, patriotism, sincerity, and loyalty are assessed");
Michelman, supra note 65, at 309-10; Weinrib, supra note 68, at 312-16, 319-25 (indicat-
ing the relationship between incommensurability and shadow markets). Regarding col-
lective choices, where decisions are unavoidable, by default or otherwise, Arrow is not
convinced that incommensurability is a problem. See Arrow, supra note 15, at 5-6. For
an example of the debate, compare E.J. Mishan, Consistency in the Valuation of Life: A
Wild Goose Chase?, Soc. Pfil. & POL'Y at 152 (Spring 1985) with Dan Usher, The Value
of Life for Decision Making in the Public Sector, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 168 (Spring 1985).
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may not remain indecisive, she is relegated largely to shooting in
the twilight guided mainly by crude instinct. When this is the
case, the decision is subject to manipulation by those with an
interest in doing so. There is little hard data to counter soft per-
suasion. From this perspective the invisible hand works well
only if seen through a telescope, not a microscope.110
The difficulty of cardinal valuation affects the nature of the
goods in the marketplace. Goods constitute a package of quali-
ties differing in ease of monetizability. The aesthetics of the tel-
evision cabinetry may be fully perceived upon inspection, while
the value of the service warranty remains dim. Competitors of
quality goods may exploit this disparity by (roughly) equaling
the discernible qualities while cutting corners on the hidden
ones. Merchants who prefer to deal in goods of overall high qual-
ity will be at a competitive disadvantage since aspects of their
excellence are imperceptible as a practical matter."1 In other
words, bad goods and services drive out good ones. The con-
sumer ends up worse off.112
D. The Theory of Second Best
Under the theory of second best, "[tihe second-best state of
affairs usually departs in several respects from the first best,
Finally, if the incommensurability stems from the fact that the goods are not at all sub-
stitutes for one another, the problem may prove irrelevant: "Resource allocation theory
is of primary importance in situations involving two or more products that can substitute
for one another to some significant extent." CALABRESi, supra note 69, at 83.
110 Yet to be asked is whether the techniques of correcting the unfairness arising
from this problem threaten even greater unfairness. Yes they do, at some point. See
Kuklin, supra note 11, at 705-12.
111 In theory, advertising can overcome consumer ignorance about the unperceived
qualities. But for some of the most important qualities, such as health and safety risks,
there is a practical disincentive. By publicizing the relative health or safety of a competi-
tive product, the producer may alarm consumers by making salient the idea that there is
a risk in both products. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J.
LEGAL STuD. 205, 211 (1973). A freerider problem also arises among competitive produc-
ers. See, e.g., Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information,
24 J.L. & EcoN. 491, 506 (1981). Finally, advertisements spelling out some of the relevant
costing notions (e.g., discounting) are hard to express in the jingles and flash of most ad
copy. See generally Kuldin, supra note 13, at 944-47.
112 Kennedy calls this phenomenon the "competitive pathology." Even the
merchants, other than the first ones who devalue the goods and services and thereby
take advantage of the preexisting goodwill, end up worse off "since they are selling less
product." See Kennedy, supra note 65, at 601-03. For the distributive consequences of
this pathology to consumers and competing merchants, see supra note 90.
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rather than being defined by exactly the same characteristics
save one."'113 In the context of the marketplace, when one of the
ideal conditions is unmet, the unpredictable rippling effects
make it exceedingly difficult or impossible to know whether, by
satisfying the other conditions, resources are efficiently allo-
cated.1 4  Distributive effects are similarly unpredictable."n
While theoretical conclusions do not collapse altogether under
circumstances of second best, caution is needed before prescrib-
ing them.
CONCLUSION
Modern economic analysis is generally predictive of efficient
moves. Nevertheless, considerations other than efficiency bear
on social choices within a legal system. Inextricably intertwined
with implementing the standard economic model are effects on
social values that should be appraised and accommodated."'
Several may be highlighted. First, social choices based on the
assumptions of economic theory have distributive effects. Some
classes of persons, such as the poor, may be made worse off." 7
113 GooDIN, supra note 22, at 134. Therefore, "[w]henever we rule out one goal as
impossible-mistakenly or otherwise-we usually readjust all our other goals as well"
Id. The leading article is R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Sec-
ond Best, 24 Rzv. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956). "The general theory of second best demon-
strates that if there are distortions from competitive equilibrium throughout the econ-
omy due to taxes or monopoly, for example, a change that can be viewed as value
maximizing in one small sector may actually decrease value overall." Rizzo, supra note
30, at 652 (footnote omitted); see also White, supra note 1, at 594 (Analysis under this
theory "proves that the intuition-that it is economically superior to achieve as many
efficient conditions as possible-is wrong."). Buchanan modifies a French aphorism to
advance a related idea: "the best may be the enemy of the tolerable." Allen R_ Buchanan,
Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 99 ETMcs 852, 860 (1959).
114 See, e.g., CALABRmSi, supra note 69, at 86-88; James R. Henderson, Jr., Extending
the Boundaries of Strict Products Liability: Implications of the Theory of Second Best,
128 U. PA. L REv. 1036, 1036-38, 1059-65 (1980); Rizzo, supra note 30, at 652-53; cf.
BucHAN, supra note 12, at 36-46 (showing difficulties in making "intersystemic effi-
ciency comparisons").
"I" See Markovitz, supra note 44, at 884-86.
1 The foibles of individuals are unimportant to economists concerned only with
large-scale phenomena or effects at the margins of consumption, or when for predictive
purposes the relevant assumptions of the ideal market can be replaced by assumptions of
random consumer behavior. "For ethical purposes, however, such assumptions would
clearly be fatal." Bennett, supra note 40, at 200.
117 See supra note 84 & infra note 122. For one example, risk attitudes or discount
rates may be related to socioeconomic class. See Kuklin, supra note 13, at 987 n.311
(high discount rates among the poor). Inasmuch as they are, the failure to account for
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Assigning entitlements on the basis of the efficiency criterion,
for example, Posner's insistence that the legal assignment of en-
titlements mimic the market, favors the wealthy who are willing
to pay more simply because they are able to pay more.118 Sec-
them will have distributive effects across classes. Furthermore, because Posner's wealth
maximization principle is systematically disadvantageous to the poor, they would not opt
for it ex ante. See Baker, supra note 43, at 9-27; Bebchuk, supra note 68, at 676-84;
Kronman, supra note 68, at 236-42.
28 See supra note 68. The most common ideological criticism is: "If rights are as-
signed this way, the richer not only get richer, but because their newly acquired entitle-
ments increase their wealth further, they are in an ever better position to increase their
wealth again by securing more rights on the grounds that their doing so is required by
efficiency." MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 256; see also Coleman, supra note 45,
at 661-64 (tracking the same arguments in similar language). Hence, "pursuing efficiency
leads inevitably to further inequities." MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 256. In
rebuttal, the authors point out, first, that "assigning rights to those willing to pay more
for them does not in fact always amount to assigning rights to those most able to pay."
Id. at 257 (emphasis omitted). Second, the authors note that "just as we recognize the
existence of cases in which, in spite of their efficiency, markets are inappropriate alloca.
tion mechanisms, proponents of economic analysis recognize that mimicking markets is
sometimes inappropriate for the very same reasons." Id. Finally, "there is nothing in
economic analysis that precludes making lump-sum transfer payments from those who
gain entitlements to those who have lost out. So the gain in efficiency need not create a
snowball effect in favor of those who obtain rights on efficiency grounds." Id. at 258.
In surrebuttal, first, even if mimicking the market does not always give entitlements
to the wealthier, it probably usually does, which is enough to raise fairness questions.
Second, even if economists sometimes recognize the inappropriateness of mimicking the
market, the question remains whether they do so often enough, since the elegance of
economic theory easily distracts one from the murkiness of fairness arguments. Cf. id. at
261 ("Economists criticize philosophers for using terms like 'justice,' 'fairness,' and 'cau-
sation' as too imprecise and murky for their taste."). Finally, because the entitlement
decisions are often made by courts, transfer payments are usually unrealistic. See Pos-
ner, supra note 9, at 104-05. Even when transfer payments are realistic, they are extraor-
dinarily rare. For one of the rare cases, see Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Day. Co.,
494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972). Legislatures also are reluctant to enact transfer payments. See
CALABREsi, supra note 69, at 79 ("[H]ypothetical compensation rarely comes about. It
may be too expensive; it may be made feasible only through the levying of taxes that
misallocate resources grievously; or it may be politically impossible to accomplish.").
Economists resist the transfers on the grounds of the second-order inefficiency in ad-
ministering them. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Luck, Soc. PHIL. & POL'y at 17 (Autumn
1988). Yes, lump-sum payments can be made under economic theory, but how often do
economists propose this? My objections are not only to what economic theory requires,
but also to what it tends to do. This is the major theme of Michelman. Michelman,
supra note 67. "[T]he success of this enterprise [of the positive economic theory of law]
helps to engender false belief about the motives and meanings of extant law and about
the right criteria for forming and appraising the law yet to be made." Id. at 1015.
"[C]ertain intellectual confusions ... may lead one who is not on guard against them to
draw unjustified normative inferences from positive, descriptive studies." Id. at 1016; see
also Michelman, supra note 65, at 315 (The "systematic indoctrination of judges with
economic learning ...might contrive to squeeze out of the law the poorly defined
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ond, certain personal behaviors or traits are rewarded and
thereby reinforced irrespective of social desirability. 1 9 For ex-
ample, the assumption of risk neutrality may redistribute wealth
from risk preferrers to avoiders, or vice versa, which may result
in a change in society's risk attitudes. The reluctance to inter-
fere with private bargains on the supposition that the parties are
equally situated may increase aggressiveness and deceitfulness.
As a final example, since uncommon preferences are often unsat-
isfied because the economies of scale make them uneconomic,
conformity is encouraged.1 20 Traits both socially desirable and
undesirable are induced, of course, the problem being that the
invisible hand is blind to the different values underlying them.
Third, preference satisfaction and success in the market, as con-
sumer or producer, are not determined only by the desert of the
individual, but rather to a large extent by the fates, or "moral
luck. '121 To generalize, important social policies fade from sight
noneconomic variables or 'other justice factors.' "). Through all this, the reader must not
be left with the impression that Murphy and Coleman agree with Posner's principle of
mimicking the market in the name of efficiency. See MuRPHY & Coxns', supra note 5,
at 262-67. The principle neither duplicates "the rational autonomous behavior of in-
formed individuals," nor necessarily "promote[s] the ends of efficiency or utility." Id. at
267.
... For an excellent development of this argument, pointing out, among other things,
that economic analysis ignores the issue of what preferences society should foster, see C.
Edwin Baker, Posner's Privacy Mystery and the Failure of Economic Analysis of Low,
12 GA. L Rxv. 475 (1978).
11o See supra note 43; ScrrovsKy, supra note 23, at 7 ("in our age of mass produc-
tion... almost nothing gets produced that cannot be produced in the thousands"); Kel-
man, supra note 40, at 795 (citing ArBFaRT D. HmscHmAN, ExIT, Vows. m LoYALT 26-
29 (1970)) (arguing that market competition does not "inevitably produce the full range
of products that is technically feasible (i.e., where demand supports production of a cer-
tain scale)."). "Where an economy is structurally unsatisfactory to consumers, competi-
tive market forces may immunize producers from pressures for change." Id. (emphasis
omitted).
121 A sample of the arguments may be summarized. Some maintain that success in
the market is due to personal characteristics which do not correlate to moral worth, but
rather are largely arbitrary from a moral point of view-a matter of luck. See, eg., Ron-
ald Dworkin, Why Liberals Should Care About Equality, in A MAnrER op PnmcwLE6
supra note 68, at 205, 206-07; RAwLs, supra note 22, at § 48. Buchanan argues, first, that
luck often governs whether one obtains or retains wealth in the market, and second, if
desert is proportional to one's contribution to the good of others, that this good is not
measured simply by the satisfaction of their preferences (e.g., supplying cigarettes or
heroin). See BucHANAN, supra note 12, at 51-53; but cf. id. at 53 ("Why should we as-
sume in the first place that one's overall share of wealth should be determined by deert
in any sense?"). Christman contends that entrepreneurs, indeed all participants in the
market, do not deserve what they get from competitive market interactions because the
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in the attempt to make the invisible hand operate as fric-
tionlessly as possible.122 Ultimately, economic models are not
purely analytic, notwithstanding some economists' protestations
to the contrary.123 Instead, economic models are normative to
the core.124
market does not satisfy "a necessary condition of the validity of a claim of personal
desert ... that a proportionality obtains between the actions upon which the desert
claim is based and the mode of treatment or object deserved, where the value of the
former determines the latter." John Christman, Entrepreneurs, Profits and Deserving
Market Shares, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y at 1, 16 (Autumn 1988). Coleman, pointing out that
noneconomic, moral justifications based on individuals' desert and rights ground efficient
redistributions, concludes "that every economic notion of efficiency is of derivative and
limited use in the public policy arena." Coleman, supra note 1, at 248. For other ethical
attacks on efficiency or the competitive system, see, e.g., Guido Calabresi, About Law
and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 553, 554-57 (1980);
Richard W. Wright, The Efficiency Theory of Causation and Responsibility: Unscien-
tific Formalism and False Semantics, 63 CHL-KENT L. REv. 553, 562-67 (1987). For a
counterattack, see George J. Stigler, Economics or Ethics?, in II THE TANNER LECTURES
ON HUMAN VALUES 143 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1981). See also Gordon Tuilock, Two
Kinds of Legal Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 659, 669 (1980) ("For those people who
want to maintain moral principles as a foundation for the law, it is fortunate that the
conflicts between efficiency and morals are not very great."). Perhaps the greatest dis-
pute between welfare-statists and libertarians is "whether one is morally entitled to the
fruits of one's good fortune in life's natural lottery of endowments and opportunities in
the face of claims of superior need due to misfortune ... ." Larry Alexander, Liberalism
as Neutral Dialogue: Man and Manna in the Liberal State, 28 UCLA L. REv. 816, 817
(1981). Even Posner acknowledges that his wealth maximization principle, along with
individualistic political philosophy, "perhaps, neglect the role of luck in wealth and pov-
erty and by doing so give excessive moral status to the condition of being a productive
person." Posner, supra note 9, at 101.
... That Adam Smith's version of the invisible hand did not lose sight of important
social policies, see Malloy, supra note 2, at 217, 229-30. The claim that Posner's version
of the invisible hand neglects important social policies led to a sharp exchange between
Posner and Malloy. See id.; Richard Posner, The Ethics of Wealth Maximization: Reply
to Malloy, 36 KAN. L. REv. 261, 263 n.6 (1988); Robin Paul Malloy, The Merits of the
Smithian Critique: A Final Word on Smith and Posner, 36 KAN. L. REv. 267 (1988).
Posner states: "I have never argued, and do not believe, that wealth maximization is or
should be the only principle of justice in our society." Posner, supra, at 263 (footnote
with references omitted). If so, even a commentator as astute as Weinrib was misled. See
Weinrib, supra note 68, at 315 ("One way, then, in which Posner's principle of wealth-
maximization differs from utilitarianism is that it insists upon the monetization of all
ethical phenomena."). Malloy is unmollified. See Malioy, supra, at 267-68.
122 See supra note 4.
124 See, e.g., JACK LIVELY, DEMOCRACY 91-98 (1975) (economic rationality requires
some specification of ends, which is normative); Sidney S. Alexander, Human Values
and Economists' Values, in HUMAN VALUES AND ECONOMIC POLICY, supra note 15, at
101, 108 (Pareto optimality "is normative to the core" despite economists' exclusion of
"other normative viewpoints as unscientific."); C. Edwin Baker, Starting Points in Eco-
nomic Analysis of Law, 8 HOFsTRA L. Rav. 939 (1980) (economic analysis of the legal
order must incorporate a normative theory of value and change); Morton J. Horwitz,
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One point must be emphasized. I have not come to bury law
and economics, I have come to praise it, though perhaps some-
what faintly. Little said about the limitations to economic analy-
sis of the law detracts from its usefulness when used properly.12 5
Economic analysis has substantially lengthened the road of legal
justification, thereby shortening the "leap of faith" awaiting at
the end of the road where analysis and reasoned policy stop and
intuition and dogma start.126 For this great contribution, let us
Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HoFsTRA L. REv. 905 (1980) (law and eco-
nomics is politics). Even for those who acknowledge the normativity of their discipline,
"[w]hat many economists do not understand is that efficiency is one value among many
and is not a meta-value that comprehends all others." Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory
and Environmental Law, 79 Micm. L. REv. 1393, 1417 (1981) (footnote omitted); see id.
at 1410-18 (defending the proposition). For example, Demsetz, stopping short of the
claim of meta-value, asserts efficiency is "an extremely important" ethical notion. "It is
difficult even to describe unambiguously any other criterion for determining what is ethi-
cal." Harold Demsetz, Ethics and Efficiency in Property Rights Systems, in Tum UN-
CERTAmTY, AND DISEQUILMRIUM, supra note 67, at 97, 109. Though cautioned against,
see, e.g., Posner, supra note 122, at 263 n.6, views like this make it all too easy for
decisionmakers to overlook the other criteria. See supra note 118; Malloy, supra note
122, at 267-68; Michelman, supra note 67, at 104647 ("Reducing law to one simple prin-
ciple that seems more prominent in the extant law than any other comparably simple
principle" (i.e., efficiency) nullifies other norms proposed or reflected in the law and "ap-
parently undermine[s] the living law theory's attempt to furnish judge-fashioned law
with a democratic base."). See generally Symposium, Ethics and Economics, Soc. PHIL
& POL'Y at 1 (Spring 1985).
15 My view of the future of law and economics is more optimistic than that of Hor-
witz, writing on the twentieth anniversary of Coase's article. He believed that the inatru-
ment had "'peaked out' as the latest fad in legal scholarship" and "will begin to fade
into a quaint and nostalgic past." Horwitz, supra note 124, at 905. Nearly ten years later,
Ellickson implies that the fade hasn't set in yet, but at least "the law and economics
movement has been losing its upward trajectory within law schools... ." Robert C. El-
lickson, Bringing Culture and Human Fraility to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classi-
cal Law and Economics, 65 CHL-KFNTr L REv. 23, 23 (1989). See also Kennedy, supra
note 67, at 444-45 (though of limited worth, the enthusiasm for efficiency will continue
"given its enormous apologetic usefulness"). The economics approach is no longer the
hottest topic in the scholarly literature, which has succeeded in achieving surprisingly
few citations in court opinions. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 4, at 78-83 ("modest"
impact on judicial decisionmaking); White, supra note 1, at 578 n.8 (nineteen opinions
citing Coase's famous article, but at an increasing rate). Anecdotally, however, it seems
that exposure to the economic approach continues in the classrooms and institute3, and
therefore, with a growing number of attorneys and judges familiar with this instrument,
it will become increasingly assimilated into ordinary legal reasoning. White shares my
prediction. See id. at 578.
"I8 Others have made similar points. For example, economic analysis, though "beset
with problems ... provides information to be added to the other relevant factors in the
analysis of... law problems .... " Harrison, supra note 4, at 101-02. While "economics
is incapable of telling judges what 'should' be done ... [it] may be useful in indicating
'how' to do something once a court has already determined what it considers to be a
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celebrate the beginning of the fourth decade of the revolution
started by Coase's article.
'just' outcome." Id. at 104 (footnote omitted). He adds elsewhere that "the current appli-
cation of economic analysis to law should be regarded as an interim step toward the
integration of law with the behavioral, natural, and social sciences." Harrison, supra note
33, at 1314 (footnote omitted). See also MANSFIELD, supra note 46, at 72-75 (The theory
of consumer behavior "provides a correct way of thinking about [a] problem. It focuses
attention on the relevant factors, and it puts them in their proper place."); POLINSKY,
supra note 45, at 134 ("[T]he fact that there are many goals that the legal system might
be viewed as trying to accomplish makes economic analysis all the more helpful in deter-
mining what the tradeoffs are among the goals and how to strike an appropriate bal-
ance."); Bruce A. Ackerman, Law, Economics, and the Problem of Legal Culture, 1986
DuKE L.J. 929 (distinguishing the strong lawyer-economists who believe economic analy-
sis is the only appropriate form of legal argument from weak lawyer-economists, "not so
imperialistic," who believe economic analysis should be pervasive, but not all-important);
Coleman, supra note 1, at 249 ("For even if efficiency does not carry the day in matters
of social policy, arguments from efficiency must be taken seriously."); Coleman, supra
note 45, at 679 ("Economic analysis is far more sophisticated and powerful than are the
vast majority of the objections raised against it."); Lewis A. Kornhauser, A Guide to the
Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 591, 637 (1980) ("Viewing
the law from an economic perspective allows the lawyer to note similarities that may
have previously escaped attention."); Stewart G. Pollock, Economic Analysis at Work in
Judicial Decision-Making, 1988 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 133, 135 ("Economics and law are
different, but each discipline can illuminate the other."); White, supra note 1, at 579
("Economic analysis by itself, unencumbered by value choices, can be an effective aid in
analyzing the issues presented in legal disputes, clarifying when a value choice must be
made, and identifying what choices are available."). White surveys the judicial opinions
citing Coase's article, see id. at 613-34, and finds that "the courts intuitively recognize
the [limited] true analytical usefulness of economic reasoning . . . [by] resort[ing] to
broader social policies to make their decisions." Id. at 612-13 (footnote omitted). In sum,
decisionmakers must not "commit the fallacy of economic determinism; that is... pro-
ceed as if economic arguments were a neutral policy value." Id. at 628.
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